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THE INTERSECTION OF RACE AND ALGORITHMIC TOOLS IN
THE CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM
VINCENT M. SOUTHERLAND*
A growing portion of the American public—including policymakers,
advocates, and institutional stakeholders—have accepted the fact that racism
endemic to the United States infects every stage of the criminal legal system.
Acceptance of this fact has resulted in efforts to address and remedy
pervasive and readily observable systemic bias. Chief among those efforts is
a turn toward technology—specifically algorithmic decision-making and
actuarial tools. Many have welcomed the embrace of technology, confident
that technological tools can solve a problem—race-based inequity—that has
bedeviled humans for generations. This Article engages that embrace by
probing the adoption of technological tools at various sites throughout the
criminal legal system and exploring their efficacy as a remedy to racial
inequality. Then, by applying a racial justice lens, this Article develops and
offers a set of prescriptions designed to address the design, implementation,
and oversight of algorithmic tools in spaces where the promise offered by
technological tools has not been met. Adherence to that lens may draw us
closer to what this Article terms a pragmatic abolitionist ethos regarding the
use of technological tools in the criminal legal system. Such an ethos does
not mean the immediate absence of a criminal legal system altogether. It
instead means a criminal system that ultimately operates in ways
dramatically different from the current regime by divesting from
incarceration and investing in community well-being, human welfare, and
rehabilitation.
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INTRODUCTION
Bubbling crack, jewel theft and robbery to combat poverty
And end up in the global jail economy
Stiffer stipulations attached to each sentence
Budget cutbacks but increased police presence
And even if you get out of prison still living
Join the other five million under state supervision
This is business: no faces, just lines and statistics
From your phone, your Zip Code to SSI digits
The system break man, child, and women into figures
Two columns for “who is” and “who ain’t [n***** ]”
Numbers is hard and real and they never have feelings
But you push too hard, even numbers got limits
– Mos Def1

[T]he great force of history comes from the fact that we carry it
within us, are unconsciously controlled by it in many ways, and
history is literally present in all that we do.
– James Baldwin2
***
No matter where one stands on matters of law and order, the problems
that characterize America’s criminal legal system are well-documented. It is
rife with inequity and plagued by unfairness. More often than not, criminal
legal system outcomes turn on the characteristics, identity, and economic
status of those targeted by the system and the actors responsible for its
operation. It is overly punitive, generally devoid of empathy, and, in large
part, fails to ensure public safety, individual accountability, or the health of
communities.3

1. MOS DEF, Mathematics, on BLACK ON BOTH SIDES (Rawkus Records 1999).
2. James Baldwin, The White Man’s Guilt, EBONY, Aug. 1965, at 47 (emphasis omitted).
3. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); RACHEL BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING
THE CYCLE OF MASS INCARCERATION (2019); PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD : POLICING BLACK MEN
(2018); DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON: VIOLENCE, MASS INCARCERATION, AND A ROAD
TO REPAIR (2019); see also Mark Osler, Short of the Mountaintop: Race Neutrality, Criminal Law,
and the Jericho Road Ahead, 49 U. MEM. L. REV. 77, 87–90 (2018) (describing racial inequality
that permeates each stage of the criminal legal system); Radley Balko, There’s Overwhelming
Evidence the Criminal-Justice System Is Racist. Here’s the Proof, WASH. POST, (June 10, 2020)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/opinions/systemic-racism-police-evidence-
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Critiques of the criminal legal system that are rooted in race and racism
have exposed it as a mechanism of social control, designed from birth to
perpetuate an oppressive regime of racial caste and fueled by an irrational
fear of people of color.4 History has witnessed the system evolve over time—
in part through intentional design, in part through benign neglect, and in part
through policies that ignore structural inequality to exacerbate harm—to
consume communities of color and relegate its subjects to second-class
citizenship.5 These critiques have laid bare the deeply problematic decisionmaking that characterizes the criminal system.
In recent years, those concerned about the failings of the system,
including policymakers, data scientists, technologists, and system actors have
turned to technology as a means of curing its ills.6 They have done so with
good intentions. Many want to eliminate racism in the system and implement
policies in service of that goal, such as shrinking the prison and jail
populations, ending money bail, and holding system actors to account for
bias.7 Data-driven, fact-based, technological interventions that inform the
decision-making of system actors are thought of as the solution.
criminal-justice-system/ (detailing a myriad of studies demonstrating racial inequity in the criminal
legal system).
4. Bryan Stevenson, Slavery Gave America a Fear of Black People and a Taste for
Punishment. Both Still Define our Criminal-Justice System, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 14, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/prison-industrial-complex-slaveryracism.html; see also Loïc Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh,
3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 95, 97 (2001) (viewing the criminal legal system, and the “penal system
as an instrument for the management of dispossessed and dishonored groups,” such that “the
astounding upsurge in black incarceration in the past three decades as a result of the obsolescence
of the ghetto as a device for caste control and the correlative need for a substitute apparatus for
keeping (unskilled) African Americans . . . in a subordinate and confined position in physical,
social, and symbolic space”); see also PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: P OLICING BLACK MEN 5
(2017) (observing that “the system is broke on purpose”).
5. Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 811, 816–20 (2017); see also supra note 4.
6. The hope that technology might resolve America’s racial ills is longstanding. As early as
1967, civil rights leader Roy Wilkins asked whether the computer could “turn its impersonal,
unprejudiced magic upon our agonizing race problem? Could it not, after digesting the facts which
whites and blacks have fogged over for so long give us an outline of our obligation? [C]an [] not
the computer become a guidepost to interracial justice and peace?” CHARLTON MCILWAIN, BLACK
SOFTWARE 243 (2020).
7. See Sam Corbett-Davies, Sharad Goel, & Sandra González-Bailón, Even Imperfect
Algorithms Can Improve the Criminal Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/upshot/algorithms-bail-criminal-justice-system.html
(extolling the potential value of technology to address inequity, bias, racism and other harmful facets
of the criminal legal system); Stephanie Wykstra, Philosopher’s Corner: What is “Fair”?
Algorithms in Criminal Justice, ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 34, no. 3 (Spring 2018),
https://issues.org/perspective-philosophers-corner-what-is-fair-algorithms-in-criminal-justice/
(same); Alex P. Miller, Want Less-Biased Decisions? Use Algorithms., HARV. BUS. REV. (July, 26,
2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/want-less-biased-decisions-use-algorithms (same).
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Unfortunately, as presently envisioned and executed, the turn to
technological tools is destined to fall short of its lofty and admirable aims.
This Article suggests that to transform the criminal legal system, advocates
need to adopt a lens centered on racial justice to inform technology-based
efforts rather than simply layering tools onto it in its current state. Doing so
would mean that rather than attempting to solve or eradicate racism, we
would account for the role that racism plays as we design, implement, and
engage in oversight of these technological tools. This Article applies a racial
justice-focused theoretical framework grounded in critical race theory to
confront and address the pressing problems presented by the use of
technological tools in the criminal legal system. Ultimately, this framework
suggests that we deploy such tools in a way that represents a paradigmatic
shift in the way our current criminal system operates.
The problem technology purports to solve is not new.8 Decision-making
in the criminal legal system depends on assessments by human beings at
every critical stage of the criminal process, from arrest and prosecution to
punishment and reintegration. The decisions that people make about other
people—and the social and cultural baggage attached to those decisions—are
among the clearest sources of systemic inequity. While some attempt to turn
a blind eye to this reality, the quantitative data and qualitative experience
make clear that the discretion of criminal legal system actors is infused with
bias.9
It is within that context, and with a growing acknowledgment of these
truths, that efforts to reform the criminal legal system have been undertaken.
8. Before algorithmic tools emerged, assessments of risk were based largely on individual
judgements—gut instinct informed by experience. Sarah L. Desmarais & Evan M. Lowder, Pretrial
Risk Assessment Tools: A Primer for Judges, Prosecutors, and Defense Attorneys, SAFETY AND
JUST.
CHALLENGE
1,
5
(2019),
http://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-Primer-February-2019.pdf. Bias was the norm,
decision-making was wildly inconsistent, and disparities emerged and grew. Id. The last decade or
so has brought with it the development and use of actuarial tools to help judges and other actors
forecast outcomes and make better decisions. Id.
9. Mona Lynch & Marisa Omori, Crack as Proxy: Aggressive Federal Drug Prosecutions and
the Production of Black—White Racial Inequality, 52 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 773, 799–803 (2018)
(concluding that prosecutorial discretion was a significant driver of racial disparities in the sentences
received for crack related offenses); Osler, supra note 3, at 79, 92 (describing “the swamp where
[racial] inequality breeds: the hidden world of discretion” and noting that
“[t]he criminal justice system as a whole abounds with unobserved discretion that masks the
influence of racial bias”); Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias
on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 805–22 (2012) (describing
the “broad and deep” nature, and potential impact of, implicit racial bias on prosecutorial discretion,
and the racially skewed system the exercise of that discretion produces); L. Song Richardson,
Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the Criminal Courtroom, 126 YALE L.J. 862, 887 (2017)
(“[T]he
enormous discretion wielded
by
prosecutors,
defense
lawyers,
and judges facilitates racial bias, both conscious and implicit.”).
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Previous waves of reform have looked to shape or somehow improve
decision-making by systemic actors to eradicate the implicit and explicit bias
that fosters injustice.10 The introduction of artificial intelligence, predictive
analytics, automated decision-making, actuarial risk assessment instruments,
and machine learning—collectively known in this Article under the general
umbrella of algorithmic tools—into the criminal legal field is, in some ways,
just the latest attempt to improve decision-making and counter the frailties of
human judgment.11
Proponents of algorithmic tools market them to criminal legal system
reformers and stakeholders as a novel approach with greater potential than

10. The federal sentencing guidelines are one example of this kind of change that ultimately
failed to yield the fairness reformers hoped they would. See Rachel E. Barkow, Sentencing
Guidelines at the Crossroads of Politics and Expertise, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1609, 1619 (2012)
(describing the adoption of the sentencing guidelines as “a story about the desire for racial justice.
Unfortunately, even a cursory look at criminal justice in the United States—in states with or without
guidelines—demonstrates that questions of racial justice have hardly been answered.”). The
guidelines were intended to weed out disparities and curtail wild inconsistencies in judgments about
individuals, while providing common factors that judges could use to consider and determine risk.
Id. at 1619–22. They were successful to a point, because they did, at times, narrow the previously
wide divergences in assessments and imposed greater uniformity in outcomes. Id. But those gains
in efficiency were outweighed by the loss of a system that imposed individualized justice for those
who came before the court. Id.
11. An algorithm is an unambiguous set of steps undertaken to solve a problem. Algorithm,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2020); Jacob Brogan, What’s the Deal With
Algorithms?, SLATE (Feb. 2, 2016, 10:29 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2016/02/whats-thedeal-with-algorithms.html. A helpful and straightforward definition of algorithmic tools are those
which apply “an automated protocol to a large volume of data to classify new subjects in terms of
the probability of expected criminal activity and in relation to the application of state coercion.”
Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043, 1060 (2019). This
definition consists of an algorithm, or an automated protocol, to “routinize[ ] a decision” about state
intrusion into one’s life. Id. The sheer volume of data examined requires the use of an algorithm
and advanced computing resources. Id. The tools are also forward looking, in that they make
predictions about future behavior or occurrences, rather than identifying historical instances of
criminal activity. Id. In this context, an algorithm is “any well-defined computational procedure
that takes some value, or set of values, as input and produces some value, or set of values, as output.”
Gabriel Nicholas, Explaining Algorithmic Decisions, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 711, 714 (2020)
(emphasis on original) (quoting THOMAS H. CORMEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS 5
(3rd ed. 2009)). An algorithm can refer to rules that produce a deductive output, or “to inductive
procedures that come up with their own rules by generalizing from examples. Algorithms that use
the latter option are called machine learning algorithms.” Id. (emphasis in original). Machine
learning uses an algorithm to create an algorithm. Id. Specifically, it uses one algorithm, a learner,
to read data as a set of numerical features, infer rules about those features to predict a particular
outcome, and then produce a model that embodies those rules. Id. I am using the term algorithmic
tools to generally refer to a range of processes and tools, but recognize that there are differences in
the methods, techniques, and development of each type of tool. See Vincent M. Southerland &
Andrea Woods, What Does Fairness Look Like? Conversations on Race, Risk Assessment Tools,
and Pretrial Justice, CTR. ON RACE, INEQUALITY, AND THE L. AT N.Y.U. LAW & AM. CIV.
LIBERTIES UNION, 1, 5–6 (Oct. 2018) (highlighting definitional differences).
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all past reform mechanisms.12 This is not surprising given the great promise
that these technologies purport to hold. They have been deployed in an
attempt to forecast where crimes may take place,13 to identify potential
perpetrators and crime victims,14 to predict one’s risk of re-arrest or
appearance in court,15 to determine an appropriate sentence,16 and to suggest
when one should be released from incarceration.17 Proponents of the tools
and stakeholders who have embraced them have heralded them as race
neutral, countering one of the most persistent and pernicious concerns with
the criminal legal system.18 And they have been posited as improving
outcomes for all.19

12. Sam Corbett-Davies, supra note 7; Anne Milgram, Why Smart Statistics are the Key to
Fighting
Crime,
TED
(Oct.
2013)
(transcript
available
at
https://www.ted.com/talks/anne_milgram_why_smart_statistics_are_the_key_to_fighting_crime/tr
anscript); Adam Neufeld, In Defense of Risk-Assessment Tools, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 22,
2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/10/22/in-defense-of-risk-assessmenttools;, Bail Reform, ARNOLD VENTURES, https://www.arnoldventures.org/work/release-decisionmaking/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2019). In part, this turn to technology exemplifies what software
developer and data journalist Meredith Broussard has called “technochauvinism,” which is “the
belief that tech always the solution.” MEREDITH BROUSSARD, ARTIFICIAL UNINTELLIGENCE: HOW
COMPUTERS MISUNDERSTAND THE WORLD 9 (2018).
13. Randy Rieland, Artificial Intelligence is Now Used to Predict Crime. But Is It Biased?,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/artificialintelligence-is-now-used-predict-crime-is-it-biased-180968337/.
14. Jeff Asher & Rob Arthur, Inside the Algorithm That Tries to Predict Gun Violence in
Chicago, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/upshot/what-analgorithm-reveals-about-life-on-chicagos-high-risk-list.html.
15. See generally Robert Werth, Risk and Punishment: The Recent History and Uncertain
Future of Actuarial, Algroithmic, and “Evidence-based” Penal Techniques, 13 SOCIO. COMPASS
126 (2019).
16. Sara Chodosh, Courts Use Algorithms to Help Determine Sentencing, but Random People
Get the Same Results, POPULAR SCI. (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.popsci.com/recidivismalgorithm-random-bias/.
17. Amy McCaig, Algorithms For Parole Can Have Serious Bias Problems, FUTURITY (Apr.
9, 2019), https://www.futurity.org/risk-assessment-tools-prison-2031222/.
18. See, e.g., Alex Chohlas-Wood & E. S. Levine, A Recommendation Engine to Aid in
Identifying Crime Patterns, 49 INFORMS J. ON APPLIED ANALYTICS 154 (2019);
Predictive Policing: Guidance on Where and When to Patrol, PREDPOL,
https://www.predpol.com/how-predictive-policing-works/ (last visited May 7, 2021) (“PredPol uses
ONLY 3 data points—crime type, crime location, and crime date/time – to create its predictions.
No personally identifiable information is ever used. No demographic, ethnic or socio-economic
information is ever used. This eliminates the possibility for privacy or civil rights violations seen
with other intelligence-led policing models.”).
19. Are We at the Tipping Point in Police-Community Relations?, PREDPOL (Jun 11, 2020,
12:02 PM), https://blog.predpol.com/are-we-at-a-tipping-point-in-police-community-relations
(purporting that “objective, agreed-upon facts” arising out of data-driven policing can be used to
provide transparency in decision making, auditability, and room for discussion around race and
policing).
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The reality falls far short of the promise. These tools, as designed and
deployed in the current legal framework, fail to correct or upend the racial
inequity that pervades the criminal legal system. Algorithmic tools aimed at
forecasting the behavior of those who are ensnared by the carceral state
ensure that all reform efforts will focus on changing the behavior of those
being consumed by the system rather than the operation of the system. By
choosing to target those who are accused and captured, algorithmic tools
presuppose that the people going through the system must be fixed or
corrected in some way, rather than altering the system itself. They foster
retail reforms where wholesale change is needed. To make matters worse,
the prevailing legal regime for rooting out racial bias in criminal legal system
decision making insulates these tools from review or intervention, preserving
the status quo. At best, they reflect the world around us. At worst, they
perpetuate “the New Jim Code,” the term given to “new technologies that
reflect and reproduce existing inequities” while being “promoted and
perceived as more objective or progressive than the discriminatory systems
of a prior era.”20
Reformers who seek to use these tools in the criminal legal system can
and should only do so when they design, deploy, and implement them with a
basic understanding of the nature of racial inequality. This idea requires that
their proponents keep a fundamental truth in mind. That truth, which
American history verifies, is that “[r]acial equality is, in fact, not a realistic
goal.”21 Simply put, racial inequality is a permanent feature of the institutions
that govern us and the society within which we exist. Or to put it in terms
that technologists are likely to understand, racism is a feature, not a bug of
American life. It is woven into the fabric of our country.
Accordingly, “[e]ven those herculean efforts we hail as successful will
produce no more than temporary ‘peaks of progress,’ short-lived victories
that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain white
dominance.”22 To the extent we hope to see more peaks of progress during
our lifetimes than valleys of despair, we would do well to accept this premise
as true and respond accordingly. That means that rather than attempt to solve
or eradicate racism, we should account for the role that racism plays as we
design, implement, and engage in oversight of these tools. The evolving
policy debate on the use of algorithmic tools provides us with an opportunity
to do just that.

20. RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY: ABOLITIONIST TOOLS FOR THE NEW JIM
CODE 10 (2019) (emphasis omitted).
21. Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 363 (1992).
22. Id. at 373 (emphasis omitted).
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the basic nature,
character, and history of algorithmic tools across various stages of the
criminal legal system, including an accounting of how they are designed, how
they work, and the interplay between racial justice and the use of the tools.23
It complements existing scholarship exposing and addressing the racial
justice and fairness concerns the tools raise.24 It also builds on my own
efforts to grapple with the intersection of race and technology 25 by
23. See infra Part I.
24. See Southerland, supra note 11 at 3, 22–25 (detailing gathering of leading experts to foster
insights on algorithmic risk assessment and race); Ngozi Okidegbe, The Democratizing Potential of
Algorithms, 53 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021); Laura M. Moy, A Taxonomy of Police
Technology’s Racial Inequity Problems, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. 139 (2019); Rashida Richardson,
Government Data Practices as Necropolitics and Racial Arithmetic, DATA AND PANDEMIC
POLITICS (Oct. 8, 2020), https://globaldatajustice.org/covid-19/necropolitics-racial-arithmetic; The
Bias Embedded in Algorithms, POCKET (June 18, 2020), https://blog.getpocket.com/2020/06/thebias-embedded-in-algorithms/ (collecting sources on technology and bias); Nicolás Rivero, The
Influential Project That Sparked the End Of IBM’s Facial Recognition Program, QUARTZ (June 10,
2020), https://qz.com/1866848/why-ibm-abandoned-its-facial-recognition-program/ (detailing how
Timnit Gebru, Joy Buolamwini, and Inioluwa Raji have shaped policy through their research); Some
Essential Reading and Research On Race and Technology, MACHINE (June 2, 2020),
https://venturebeat.com/2020/06/02/some-essential-reading-and-research-on-race-and-technology/
(collecting research on race, technology, and bias); Marie Hicks, Fixing Tech’s Built-In Bias,
AMERICAN
SCIENTIST,
https://www.americanscientist.org/article/fixing-techs-built-in-bias
(reviewing literature on race and technology); UCLA Center for Critical Internet Inquiry, Essential
Books by Black Scholars on Technology, Science, and Race, https://www.c2i2.ucla.edu/racialjustice-and-tech/ (collecting sources); Rachel Courtland, Bias Detectives: The Researchers Striving
to Make Algorithms Fair, NATURE (June 20, 2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-01805469-3 (identifying researchers engaged in algorithmic justice work); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias in,
Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218 (2019); Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103
MINN. L. REV. 303, 341 (2018); Brandon Buskey & Andrea Woods, Making Sense of Pretrial Risk
Assessment, CHAMPION, June 2018; John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead:
Risk Assessment and the Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725 (2018); Sonja Starr,
Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV.
803 (2014).
25. See SOUTHERLAND, supra note 11; Vincent Southerland, With AI and Criminal Justice, the
Devil is in the Data, ACLU BLOG (Apr. 9, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacytechnology/surveillance-technologies/ai-and-criminal-justice-devil-data.
From 2018-2019, I
served on an expert Research Advisory Council to provide guidance and consultation as New York
City redesigned its pretrial release assessment instrument. Luminosity & the University of
Chicago’s Crime Lab New York, Updating the New York City Criminal Justice Agency Release
Assessment 1, 2, 43–44 (June 2020), https://www.nycja.org/assets/Updating-the-NYC-CriminalJustice-Agency-Release-Assessment-Final-Report-June-2020.pdf. I also served on New York
City’s Automated Decision Systems Task Force, the first of its kind in the United States, which was
established in 2018 and charged with recommending a process for reviewing the City’s use of
automated decision systems. See New York City Automated Decision Systems Task Force Report,
N.Y.C.
AUTOMATED
DECISION
SYS.
TASK
FORCE,
(2019),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/adstaskforce/downloads/pdf/ADS-Report-11192019.pdf;
Rashida
Richardson, Jason M. Schultz, & Vincent M. Southerland, Litigating Algorithms 2019 US Report:
New Challenges to Government Use of Algorithmic Decision Systems, AI NOW INST. (Sept.2019).
https://ainowinstitute.org/litigatingalgorithms-2019-us.html.
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underscoring a truth common to the current menu of algorithmic tools: that
if we proceed along our present course, we can at best expect the reification
of the pervasive inequities of today.
Part II addresses the potential solutions to the concerns raised by risk
assessments in the criminal system.26 It expands on a growing body of
scholarship that grapples with the intersection of race, algorithmic tools, and
the law,27 to produce a series of policy recommendations for how we design,
deploy, and assess technological tools in the criminal system. Those policy
recommendations include acknowledging the permanence of racism; putting
the onus on system actors and tool designers to demonstrate that they do not
perpetuate racial harms, regardless of the intent of those who seek to use
them; turning the tools on the actors in the system to scrutinize their behavior;
and emphasizing qualitative narratives over quantitative data as we press for
a system of individualized justice that values the dignity of those facing its
punishing power.
Part III concludes with a discussion of the implications of using a racial
justice framework and the interventions I have suggested.28
The
recommendations set forth in this Article proceed from the premise that
algorithmic tools have the potential to do just as much, if not more, harm than
good. Immediate abolition of them or the system in which they operate is
unlikely. But the implementation of the recommendations has the potential
to bring us one step closer to a criminal legal system radically different than
the one we currently employ. Such a system is one in which we have chosen
to divest from policing, jails, prisons, and punishment and to invest in
education, employment, health, and social welfare. That amounts to a
transformation of our criminal system rather than a reform of it.
I. ALGORITHMIC TOOLS IN THE CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM
To begin the examination of the intersection of race and algorithmic
tools, it is important to explore the suite of normative concerns and practical
challenges that the tools raise at various stages of the criminal system. That
focus will unearth the problems presented by the data the tools rely on, the
targets that those who traditionally wield them choose, and the critical

26. See infra Part II.
27. See generally Sean Hill, Bail Reform & the (False) Racial Promise of Algorithmic Risk
Assessment, UCLA L. REV. (2021) (forthcoming) (applying a racial justice framework rooted in
critical race theory to analyze pretrial risk assessments and bail reform in New York and California);
BENJAMIN, supra note 20 (applying and synthesizing critical race theory and algorithmic tools);
Dorothy E. Roberts, Digitizing the Carceral State, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (2019) (analyzing the
role of race, big data, automation, and computerized prediction in the criminal legal system).
28. See infra Part III.
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questions that the tools fail to contemplate. By considering these problems
in the context of the tools being used in policing, pretrial decision-making,
and sentencing, this Part will offer an analytical frame to explore how the
theoretical problems play out in practice.29 Ultimately, this Part demonstrates
that if we continue to use these tools in their current configuration, we will
only succeed in replicating the bias, racism, and inequity that currently
characterizes and consumes the criminal legal system.
A. Brief Introduction to Algorithmic Tools
We begin with a working definition of algorithmic tools. As used in this
Article, this term refers to any tools that use statistical data related to past
behavior and other relevant traits to predict present or future criminal
behavior with the objective of informing decisionmakers about the
appropriate criminal legal system outcome or response.30
A helpful distinction can be drawn between two sets of tools—
predictive tools, which attempt to forecast a particular event or outcome, and
surveillance tools, which are used to monitor people, places, and things. The
focus of this Article is on predictive tools, which fall within the larger field
of predictive analytics: “the use of statistically analyzed data to predict future
outcomes.”31 This feature—the analysis and use of group-level data to

29. Two points are worth raising. First, while I discuss the problems with the tools at specific
stages, those problems are not at all limited to those stages. Each stage provides a lens through
which we can see how algorithmic tools operate in practice. It is very much the case that the
problems with the design and use of an actuarial tool in, for example, policing may present
themselves at bail or sentencing. Second, it is also true that in their deployment and implementation,
the tools that I discuss produce additional problems that are worthy of attention. Accordingly, the
concerns I have raised are not exhaustive but are intended to capture the broader challenges that the
tools present.
30. The term algorithmic tool encompasses what are commonly known as actuarial risk
assessments, predictive instruments that use “statistical rather than clinical methods on large
datasets of criminal offending rates” and other data deemed relevant to the decision-making process
“to determine different levels of offending” or behavior “associated with one or more group traits”
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, Against Prediction: Sentencing, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial
Age 3 (UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, 2008); see also Huq, supra note 11, at 1060 (“Algorithmic
criminal justice . . . is the application of an automated protocol to a large volume of data to classify
new subjects in terms of the probability of expected criminal activity and in relation to the
application of state coercion.”); Mayson, supra note 24, at 2228 (referring to “criminal justice risk
assessment” as “the actuarial assessment of the likelihood of some future event, usually arrest for
crime.”); John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the
Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1752 (2018) (“Typically, risk assessment tools use
data about groups of people, like those who have been arrested or convicted, to assess the probability
of future behavior.”).
31. Jessica M. Eaglin, Predictive Analytics’ Punishment Mismatch, 14 I/S: J/L & POL’Y FOR
INFO SOC’Y 87, 87 (2017).
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forecast individual behavior—is common to all predictive algorithmic tools32
across the criminal legal system.
Algorithmic tools carry with them the promise that they will inform and
improve decision-making by the actors employing them. Naturally,
discretion provides an entry point for biases to operate, producing unfair
outcomes that flow from those biases. Given the centrality of race to the
critiques often leveled at the criminal legal system, it should come as no
surprise that proponents of algorithmic tools justify their development and
use, in part, because they seek to confront and eradicate systemic racial bias
and curb biased decision-making. Accordingly, the tools are marketed as
race neutral—free from the biases that plague human decision-making,33
ultimately yielding decisions that are free from bias. Practice, theory, and
history paint a different picture—one that is worth confronting if we are ever
to advance justice.
What follows is an accounting of the development and use of these tools
in policing, pretrial justice, and sentencing.34 That accounting is framed by
the concerns these tools raise: specifically that they yield biased forecasts
because they utilize biased data; that they are aimed at those already targeted
by the criminal legal system rather than actors in it; and that they encourage
profiling.
B. Algorithmic Tools and Policing
1. Theory
The first iteration of algorithmic tools in policing traces back to the
twentieth century and the rise of “environmental criminology,” which

32. See supra notes 29 and 30.
33. The vendors themselves are consistent sources of this marketing. Predictive Policing:
Guidance on Where and When to Patrol, PREDPOL http://www.predpol.com/how-predictivepolicing-works/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2020) (“No demographic, ethnic or socio-economic information
is ever used. This eliminates the possibility for privacy or civil rights violations seen with other
intelligence-led policing models.”); Predictive Policing Research Breaks New Ground in
Philadelphia, YAHOO! FIN., (Oct. 17, 2013), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/predictive-policingresearch-breaks-ground-130000154.html (“Not only does HunchLab enable the combination of
many data sources and the intelligent use of temporal patterns, but the new predictive model also
enables the prioritization of patrols based on societal impact and local priorities. This data-driven
process leads to resource allocations that accurately and fairly reflect societal priorities for public
safety, unbiased by neighborhood affluence, race or ethnicity.”); COMPAS Risk & Needs
Assessment
System,
NORTHPOINTE
(2012)
http://www.northpointeinc.com/files/downloads/FAQ_Document.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2020)
(“The tool works well between genders and ethnicities.”).
34. See supra note 30 (providing explanations of how algorithmic tools work).
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focused on the “geography of crime.”35 The idea was to identify and map
patterns of criminal behavior to inform policing.36 Over time, the same maps
evolved into digital maps of reported crimes using historical crime data.37
Police departments eventually hired crime analysts to synthesize crime data
and to assist law enforcement with the deployment of limited policing
resources.38
William Bratton, the Commissioner of the New York City Police
Department (“NYPD”), and Jack Maple, the NYPD’s Deputy Commissioner
for Crime Control Strategies,39 pioneered data-centered policing.40 The two
developed CompStat, which allowed police leadership to examine reported
crime statistics and engage in targeted enforcement to address and reduce
crime, measured by arrest rates.41 These tactics grew out of concerns about
systemic corruption in the NYPD and political pressure to address high levels
of crime.42
Data, law enforcement policymakers thought, fostered
accountability and professionalism, while reducing crime.43 When Bratton
35. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U.L. REV. 1109, 1123
(2017).
36. Id. at 1123.
37. Id. at 1124.
38. Id.
39. Bratton served two terms as NYPD Commissioner, from 1994 to 1996 and from 2014 to
2016. Al Baker & J. David Goodman, Bratton, Who Shaped an Era in Policing, Tries to Navigate
a
Racial
Divide,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
25,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/26/nyregion/william-bratton-new-york-city-policecommissioner.html. The development of data-centered policing took place during his first term. Id.
Maple, for his part, in the 1980s “mapped every train and train station in New York City.” He
would then use “crayons to mark every violent crime, robbery and grand larceny that occurred,”
indicating the solved and the unsolved.
Predictive Crime Fighting, IBM,
https://www.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/crimefighting/ (last visited January 8, 2020).
“Using these maps, police officers knew which neighborhoods were being hit by what crimes, and
could more efficiently patrol and assist those areas. It was an important first step toward
consolidating police data into a tool for crime analysis and prevention.” Id. The post 9/11 era has
seen a proliferation of data-centered policing, as traditional policing expanded to include antiterrorism and sought to collect and analyze data in keeping with that mission. Paul Hamrick,
Fighting Crime with Data: Law Enforcement in the 21st Century, FORENSIC FOCUS, (July 5, 2019),
https://www.forensicfocus.com/articles/fighting-crime-with-data-law-enforcement-in-the-21stcentury/.
40. ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE,
AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 29 (2017).
41. Id.
42. Id.; see also Predictive Crime Fighting, supra note 39.
43. FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 30. It is worth noting that a drop in New York City’s crime
rate did coincide with the adoption of CompStat, though it is unclear how much CompStat
contributed to that decline. Chris Smith, The Controversial Crime-Fighting Program That Changed
Big-City Policing Forever, N.Y. MAG., (Mar. 2018), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/03/thecrime-fighting-program-that-changed-new-york-forever.html. While “CompStat has helped drive
down the city’s crime rates to historic lows and revolutionized policing around the world,” it also
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moved from the NYPD to the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) in
2002, he brought his CompStat approach to another police department reeling
from scandal, fraud, and corruption.44
Thus began the first efforts to develop predictive policing technologies.
Working with academics at area universities, the LAPD experimented with
an algorithm to forecast the locations of potential criminal activity.45 In
practice, the analysts fed the algorithm historical crime data to predict the
likely location of criminal activity.46 The program focused on property
crimes—specifically burglary, automobile theft, and theft of items from
automobiles.47 A seemingly objective set of considerations informed that
focus. First, this suite of crimes generated concern over public safety, tended
to be reported and were, therefore, measurable. They could also be addressed
by policing practices; they arose from “environmental vulnerabilities” that
policing could remedy, and an increased police presence could operate as a
deterrent.48
The algorithm produced forecasts of criminal activity in geographically
precise areas.49 Police received maps of those areas and instructions to visit
them as often as practicable while on patrol.50 Criminological theory
informed practice—resting on the notion that property crimes tend to spread
like viruses, either because the environment encourages them or because the
same people return to commit them again.51 Additional variables, like the
weather, time of day, proximity to an event, or seasons, provided additional
data points for prediction.52
Property crime prediction proved to be just the starting point. Two
additional versions of predictive policing were developed. The place-based,
property-crime-focused iteration of predictive policing evolved to target
violent crime.53 Driving this evolutionary change was the theory that violent
crime is the product of particular environmental conditions—a dimly lit alley,
proximity to potential victims, gang-related disputes for control over specific

fueled a stop and frisk policing regime that led to the harassment of countless New Yorkers of color,
driving “considerable debate on just how much credit CompStat, and the NYPD in general, deserves
for the crime decline.” Id.
44. See FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 29.
45. Ferguson, supra note 35, at 1126.
46. Id. at 1127.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1126–27.
49. Id. at 1127.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1128
52. Id. at 1129.
53. Id. at 1132.
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territory.54 Thus, like place-based, property-crime-focused predictive
policing, this iteration relied on the notion that “place-based environmental
vulnerabilities exist that encourage violent crime, and thus should create a
higher risk that crime will occur in that location.”55
The third iteration of predictive policing represented more of a
transformational change. Police began to use “predictive technologies to
identify individuals and groups involved in predicted criminal activity.” 56
Like the relationships between crime and environmental factors that
undergird place-based systems, person-based systems rest on the notion that
“negative social networks . . . can encourage criminal activity.”57 This third
mode of predictive policing assumes that a small portion of the population
possesses an elevated risk of becoming the victim or perpetrator of violence,
and that these individuals can be mapped out as a social network to be
pinpointed, marked, and surveilled.58 The result is a shift from “hot spots”
where crime might occur to “hot people” who may engage in (or be victims
of) violence.59 Technological advances allowed for intelligence collection
and surveillance of suspected individuals and criminal networks, eventually
leading to interventions by law enforcement that range from warnings of
harsh punishment for targets to increased surveillance.60
2. Practice
The record on predictive policing technology is mixed at best. An
accounting of initial success in property crime reductions in several
California cities—such as Los Angeles, Santa Cruz, Alhambra, and Modesto,
along with positive results in Seattle and Atlanta—have been undermined by
tests that showed inconclusive results or spikes in crime following initial
drops.61 Boston saw a reduction in violent crime after policing targeted
locations where shootings were more likely to take place.62 Likewise, the
city of New Orleans saw a steep decline in its homicide rate after
implementing a strategy to target and investigate a cohort of individuals with
the highest risk of being involved in gun violence.63
54. Id. at 1132–33.
55. Id. at 1137.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1138.
59. Id. at 1140.
60. Id. at 1140–43.
61. Id. at 1130.
62. Id. at 1134.
63. Id. at 1142. The New Orleans predictive policing experiment ended in 2018, when New
Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu declined to renew the city’s partnership with Palantir, a Palo Alto
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Yet even these modest successes must be weighed against the potential
harm that flows from the use of these tools. In 2016, the Human Rights Data
Analysis Group (“HRDAG”) reproduced the algorithm utilized by PredPol,
a predictive policing software that dozens of police departments nationwide
have adopted.64 PredPol’s software consults historical crime data to forecast
particular areas—so-called hotspots—that officers should target on a given
day.65 The HRDAG researchers inputted crime data from Oakland,
California in order to use the PredPol software to forecast potential drug
crime.66 In response, the algorithm advised the police to target low-income
neighborhoods of color, despite concurrent evidence from public health data
that drug use is more evenly dispersed throughout the city, and that policing
should likewise be more evenly dispersed.67 This disparity, HRDAG
contended, is because officer explicit and implicit biases rooted in race about
who to stop, search, and arrest, plagued the records utilized to inform the
data, such that the algorithm almost necessarily reproduces accumulated
patterns of biased over-policing.68 Thus, when informed by discriminatory
data, the algorithm will work to encourage similarly discriminatory police
behavior.69

based data analytics company. Jonathan Bullington & Emily Lane, New Orleans ends its
relationship With Tech Firm Palantir, Landrieu’s Office says, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 14, 2018),
https://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2018/03/palantir_new_orleans_gang_case.html.
Unbeknownst to the New Orleans City Council or the public, Palantir had been operating in New
Orleans for six years. Ali Winston, Palantir Has Secretly Been Using New Orleans to Test Its
Predictive
Policing
Technology,
VERGE
(Feb.
27,
2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/27/17054740/palantir-predictive-policing-tool-new-orleansnopd.
64. Katia Savchuk, Justice by The Numbers: Meet the Statistician Trying to Fix Bias in
Criminal Justice Algorithms, PACIFIC STANDARD (Feb. 1, 2019), https://psmag.com/socialjustice/justice-by-the-numbers-meet-the-statistician-trying-to-fix-bias-in-criminal-justicealgorithms.
65. Id.; see also Overview, PredPol, https://www.predpol.com/about/ (PredPol’s software
“identif[ies] the times and locations where specific crimes are most likely to occur . . . based on on
victimization information.”).
66. Kristian Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, 13 SIGNIFICANCE 14, 17 (2016). The
results of Lum and Isaac’s study have been saddled with the qualification that PredPol is not used
to predict drug crimes. Jack Smith IV, Crime-Prediction Tool PredPol Amplifies Racially Biased
Policing, Study Shows, MIC (Oct. 9, 2016), https://www.mic.com/articles/156286/crime-predictiontool-pred-pol-only-amplifies-racially-biased-policing-study-shows. This qualification, while valid,
does not detract from what the study demonstrated: “the potential for predictive policing software
to perpetuate historical biases in enforcement.” William Isaac & Kristian Lum, Setting the Record
Straight on Predictive Policing and Race, MEDIUM (Jan. 3, 2018), https://medium.com/in-justicetoday/setting-the-record-straight-on-predictive-policing-and-race-fe588b457ca2.
67. Lum & Isaac, supra note 66, at 17.
68. Id. at 15.
69. Id.
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Person-based predictive systems suffer from similar shortcomings. A
RAND Corporation70 study of the Chicago Police Department’s (“CPD”)
Strategic Subject List (“SSL”) is a helpful example. The SSL is “a
computerized assessment tool that incorporates numerous sources of
information to analyze crime as well as identifies and ranks individuals at
risk of becoming a victim or possible offender in a shooting or homicide.”71
Developed by the Illinois Institute of Technology, and utilized by the CPD
as early as 2012, this tool assigns risk tiers to individuals based on variables,
like an individual’s age during their latest arrest, the number of times they
have been apprehended for use of an unlawful weapon, and the number of
times they have been a victim of aggravated assault and battery.72 Because
the majority of these variables rely upon arrest records rather than actual
convictions, however, the SSL runs a high risk of including individuals who
have not even committed a crime, and of reflecting the CPD’s biased policing
practices.73 Indeed, research demonstrated that the SSL led to increased
contact with those who were already in frequent contact with law
enforcement.74 What is worse, the SSL did not reduce gun violence, even as
the number of individuals on the list tripled over three years.75
70. According to its website, “The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops
solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more
secure, healthier and more prosperous.” About the RAND Corporation, RAND CORP.,
https://www.rand.org/about.html (last visited June 1, 2021). RAND describes its history as follows:
“On May 14, 1948, Project RAND—an organization formed immediately after World War II to
connect military planning with research and development decisions—separated from the Douglas
Aircraft Company of Santa Monica, California, and became an independent, nonprofit organization.
Adopting its name from a contraction of the term research and development, the newly formed
entity was dedicated to furthering and promoting scientific, educational, and charitable purposes for
the public welfare and security of the United States.” History and Mission, RAND CORP.,
https://www.rand.org/about/history.html (last visted June 1, 2021).
71. Rashida Richardson et al., Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights Violations Impact
Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 15, 31 (2019)
72. Id.
73. An arrest of a particular nature and character does not always yield a conviction of the same
nature and character for the individual arrested, especially in those instances when law enforcement
authorities engage in biased policing. Id. at 28–29, 29 n.57 (citing a Department of Justice
investigatory report that found the Chicago Police Department’s pattern or practice of
unconstitutional conduct resulted in false arrests and convictions of incalculable proportion).
74. David Robinson & Logan Koepke, UPTURN, STUCK IN A PATTERN: EARLY EVIDENCE ON
“PREDICTIVE POLICING” AND CIVIL RIGHTS 9 (2016), https://www.upturn.org/
static/reports/2016/stuck-in-a-pattern/files/Upturn_-_Stuck_In_a_Pattern_v.1.01.pdf.
75. Id. Notably, the Chicago Police Department decommissioned the SSL in January 2020
following a report by the Office of Inspector General detailing myriad problems with the program.
Sam Charles, CPD Decommissions ‘Strategic Subject List’, CHI. SUN –TIMES (Jan. 27, 2020,
2:11pm),
https://chicago.suntimes.com/city-hall/2020/1/27/21084030/chicago-police-strategicsubject-list-party-to-violence-inspector-general-joe-ferguson.
Those problems included “the
unreliability of risk scores and tiers; improperly trained sworn personnel; a lack of controls for
internal and external access; interventions influenced by . . . risk models which may have attached
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Significant harms can flow from an algorithmic tool that targets policing
in particular communities and suggests repeatedly returning to those
communities.76 For example, more interactions between Black people and
police make Black people vulnerable to violence at the hands of law
enforcement; increases the likelihood of arrest; and fosters likely
involvement with the criminal legal system, driving up rates of arrest and
incarceration.77 Repeated exposure to police tends to increase the
vulnerability of those policed to “violence-producing insecurities” that
officers experience during encounters.78 Finally, Black people who come
into frequent (and unwarranted) contact with law enforcement develop a
decreased perception of police legitimacy, which can cause them to “resist
police authority, assert rights, or flee upon seeing or encountering the police,
each of which increases the likelihood of police violence.”79
Despite the real world harms these tools can produce, it is hard to argue
with the use of technology when success is defined as less crime, more cases
cleared, and a greater sense of public safety for some segment of society. On
those terms, even the minimal success of these tools allows justice actors who
seek to use them to ignore a number of questionable assumptions under the
veneer of a technological solution.80 Chief among those assumptions is one
of the basic vulnerabilities of all actuarial risk assessments raised by the
problems revealed through studies of predictive policing tools: bad data.

negative consequences to arrests that did not result in convictions; and a lack of a long-term plan to
sustain the . . . models.” Id. (quoting Office of Inspector General) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
76. See Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the
Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1509 (2016) (noting that heightened police interactions with Black
communities not only reflects, but also reinforces racial stereotypes of Black people as violent and
dangerous).
77. Id. at 1508–11.
78. Id. One example of this phenomenon is “‘masculinity threat,’ which is an officer’s sense
that his masculinity is being undermined or challenged during an interaction.” Id. Officers who
experience this phenomenon are, on balance, more likely to deploy violence than those who do not.
Id; see also L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Interrogating Racial Violence, 12 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 115, 128–42 (2014) (defining and discussing masculinity threat and its relationship to
racial violence).
79. Carbado, supra note 76, at 1511; see also CIVIL RTS. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT (2016), at 7.
80. In June 2020, the city of Santa Cruz, California, recognizing the concerns raised by
predictive policing, became the first American city to bar its use. Nicholas Ibarra, Santa Cruz,
Calif., Bans Predictive Policing Technology, GOV’T. TECH. (June 24, 2020),
https://www.govtech.com/public-safety/Santa-Cruz-Calif-Bans-Predictive-PolicingTechnology.html.
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3. Critique: Flawed Data as Destiny and Garbage In, Garbage Out
Data is the lifeblood of all predictive technology. In the context of the
criminal legal system, data is rife with imperfections and is irreversibly
tainted by racism and the social hierarchies it produces and supports.81 Those
indelible flaws are, in large part, the byproduct of the nature of crime data—
police do not just use data—they create the data that algorithmic tools and
technologies depend on.82 Thus, police decision-making plays an outsized
role in shaping our perceptions of crime and criminal behavior.83 The
vulnerabilities in the data start with simple, innocent, human error: People
can make mistakes in data collection, input, integration of datasets, and
cleansing to remedy duplicative entries.84 Data can also be incomplete, as its
creation is often wholly dependent on actors within the criminal legal
system—both the consumers and the consumed.85 Everything from the
underreporting of crime by communities that have lost faith in law
enforcement, or have some other reason not to report crime,86 to the
manipulation of crime statistics87 by police can produce data that paints an
incomplete portrait of a community—and therefore an incomplete and flawed
field of vision for a predictive policing tool.
Another source of this flawed data problem, independent from the
motivations of the stat-juking officer, emerges from the nature of interactions
between police and citizens. Arrest statistics, which mark the point of contact
between law enforcement and alleged perpetrators, are not updated to reflect

81. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Illuminating Black Data Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
503, 504 (2018) (explaining that all big data policing technologies suffer from a lack of
transparency, racial bias, and legal uncertainty).
82. Elizabeth E. Joh, Feeding the Machine: Policing, Crime Data & Algorithms, 26 WM. &
MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 287, 289 (2017) (emphasis omitted).
83. Id. at 290.
84. Ferguson, supra note 35, at 1145–46.
85. Id. at 1146–47; see also BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT
PERMISSION 266–68 (2017) (detailing the potential ways data can be erroneous given how it is
gathered).
86. See P. Jeffrey Brantingham, The Logic of Data Bias and its Impact on Place-Based
Predictive Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 473, 475 (2018) (explaining that crime is substantially
underreported across crime types by all racial groups, though at varying degrees); see also Ferguson,
supra note 81, at 514–16 (describing differences in crime reporting by communities of color and
for particular types of crime).
87. Matt Hamilton, LAPD Captain Accuses Department of Twisting Crime Statistics to Make
City Seem Safer, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lapdcrime-stats-claim-20171103-story.html; see also Brantingham, supra note 86, at 475 (“A related
source of bias is police intentionally undercounting crime either through intentional mislabeling or
failing to report” stemming from “perverse incentives for police to make the world seem better than
it actually is.”).
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how the arrest was resolved by the criminal legal system.88 Cases that the
government dismisses, or those that resolve with a plea on charges less
serious than those for which an arrest was made, or those where an accused
person accepts a plea to charged conduct that they did not in fact commit,
will naturally skew the data and likewise present a distorted picture of when
and where crime is occurring and who is responsible for it.89 For example,
an individual may be arrested for a robbery and charged accordingly (or
institutional pressures may lead a prosecutor to charge the most serious
offense consistent with the facts presented). Ultimately, that case may be
resolved with a guilty plea to a lesser charge—such as assault or theft—that
more closely aligns with the behavior of the accused. Traditional crime data
would reflect the robbery, rather than the ultimate, less serious outcome.
What is reflected and read in the data is a community that appears to be
dramatically more dangerous than it actually is.
Compounding the concerns raised by these serious shortcomings is the
fact that the most pressing data-related problems occur at the intersection of
race: biased data.90 Simply put, “[p]olice data remains colored by explicit
and implicit bias. Police data is racially coded, shaded by millions of
distrustful looks and thousands of discomfiting physical encounters.”91 A
cursory examination of policing practices reveals the pervasive influence of
bias—and racial bias in particular—on law enforcement.92

88. Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 133–34
(2018).
89. See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. (Nov. 20 2014),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/; Walter Pavlo,
Are Innocent People Pleading Guilty? A New Report Says Yes, FORBES (July 31 2018, 8:06 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2018/07/31/are-innocent-people-pleading-guilty-a-newreport-says-yes/?sh=2858edea5193; Jed S. Rakoff, WHY THE INNOCENT P LEAD GUILTY AND THE
GUILTY GO FREE (2021).
90. Ferguson, supra note 35, at 1148–49.
91. FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 131–32.
92. Balko, supra note 3 (collecting seventeen studies produced examining data from 2002
detailing racial bias and discriminatory policing). Rooting out misconduct and bias is incredibly
challenging, given that there are more than 18,000 law enforcement agencies nationwide. CIVIL
RTS. DIV., UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S PATTERN AND
PRACTICE POLICE REFORM WORK: 1994-PRESENT 1 (Jan. 2017). Since 1994, the Department of
Justice’s Civil Rights Division has had the authority to investigate and litigate cases involving
patterns or practices by law enforcement that violate the Constitution or federal civil rights statutes.
Id. at 3. Since the Division began that work, it has opened sixty-nine formal investigations and
entered into forty reform agreements addressing their investigatory findings. Id. See Richardson et
al., supra note 71, at 199–202 (describing how criminal legal system data is reflective of biased
police practices).
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Behind the deaths of George Floyd, Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Tamir
Rice, Philando Castille, Stephon Clark, Pamela Turner, Korryn Gaines,93 and
countless other people of color killed by the police are staggering data points
that underscore the racism that pervades policing.94 Black people are more
likely than their white counterparts to be stopped, searched, arrested, and
victimized by the police.95 A 2019 analysis of 100 million municipal and
state patrol traffic stops from dozens of jurisdictions nationwide over a
decade revealed that Black drivers are 20% more likely to be pulled over than
their white counterparts.96 The same analysis determined that the threshold
for searching Black and Latino drivers was lower than that applied to their
white counterparts, meaning that searches of Black and Latino drivers were
premised on fewer contextual factors that give rise to suspicion than searches
of white drivers.97 For young men of color, police force is among the leading
causes of death.98 About 1 in 1,000 Black men and boys can expect to lose
their lives to police violence—a risk 2.5 times higher than that of their white
peers.99 On the whole, Black people are three times more likely to be killed
by police.100 These numbers, along with the incidents they represent, led to
investigations by the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division, which
found widespread racially discriminatory policing practices in places like

93. In 2019 alone, 999 people were shot and killed by the police, 249 of whom were Black, 163
of whom were Hispanic (for a total of 367 non-white victims) and 405 of whom were white, with
the remainder reported as being of unknown or other races. Fatal Force, WASH. POST,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/national/police-shootings-2019/ (Aug. 10, 2020).
For a sampling of media reports regarding this phenomena, see 110 Black Men And Boys Killed By
Police, NEWONE (May 5, 2021), https://newsone.com/playlist/black-men-boy-who-were-killed-bypolice/item/53; #SayHerName: Black Women And Girls Killed By Police, NEWSONE (Oct. 14,
2019), https://newsone.com/playlist/black-women-girls-police-killed-photos/item/1.
94. See Mapping Police Violence, https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/ (last updated February
16, 2021) (providing a comprehensive statistical examination of police violence and deaths at the
hands of law enforcement since 2013).
95. Elizabeth Hinton et al., An Unjust Burden: The Disparate Treatment of Black Americans in
the Criminal Justice System, VERA INST. JUST. (May 2018), https://storage.googleapis.com/veraweb-assets/downloads/Publications/for-the-record-unjust-burden/legacy_downloads/for-therecord-unjust-burden-racial-disparities.pdf.
96. Emma Pierson et al., A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across
The
United
States,
4
NATURE
HUMAN
BEHAVIOR
736,
737
(2019),
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-020-0858-1.
97. Id. at 6.
98. Frank Edwards et. al., Risk of Being Killed by Police Use of Force in the United States by
Age, Race–Ethnicity, and Sex, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16,793, 16,793
https://www.pnas.org/content/116/34/16793.
99. Amina Khan, Getting Killed by Police is a Leading Cause of Death for Young Black Men
in America, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/science/story/2019-0815/police-shootings-are-a-leading-cause-of-death-for-black-men.
100. Mapping Police Violence, supra note 94.
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Ferguson, Missouri; Newark, New Jersey; Baltimore, Maryland; New York,
New York; and Chicago, Illinois. 101
Given the racialized nature of policing, it should come as no surprise
that law enforcement practices have generated biased data. Reliance on
biased data by predictive policing tools has the potential to produce
devastating consequences.102 Predictive policing tools “look[ ] at crime in
one geographic area, incorporate[ ] it into historical patterns,” 103 and deliver
a prediction that often justifies a continued or increased police presence in a
particular community.104 The effect is twofold.105 First, targeting of law
enforcement resources in a specific community based on past policing
patterns may lead to more arrests of individuals in that community, giving
the impression that members of that community are more likely to engage in
criminal behavior.106 Second, the mere presence of law enforcement
guarantees an increase in arrests, and, in turn, the creation of more bad data.
The result is a “pernicious feedback loop”, where “[t]he policing itself
spawns new data, which then justifies more policing.”107
In other words, human fallibilities that track racial inequities taint the
precise data on which we focus these tools. For example, a host of factors
feed into the discretion exercised by officers deciding whether to make a stop
and arrest. Those factors might relate to the dynamics of the interaction
between suspect and officer. The wishes of a complainant can affect both the
decision to charge and the nature of the charge. The incentives for increased
or decreased enforcement affect officers’ decisions about formal intervention
versus informal resolution of misconduct.108 These variables shape the data

101. For a summary of the findings of DOJ’s work in these jurisdictions, see CIVIL RTS. DIV.,
supra note 92.’
102. Indeed, civil rights leader Roy Wilkins, the Executive Secretary and Executive Director of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People from 1955 through 1977,
expressed this precise concern with the advent of computers in a 1967. See MCILWAIN, supra note
6, at 242 (“He knew that white America associated black people with crime. He was afraid that that
association, and data that confirmed it, would be fed into, ingested in, and processed by a powerful
new computer system—one that stored, connected, and distributed large amounts of decisiondriving data that could negatively impact black people’s lives.”).
103. CATHY O’NEILL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 75 (2016).
104. Ferguson, supra note 35, at 1148–49.
105. See Brantingham, supra note 86 at 475 (describing how implicit bias can affect a place
based predictive policing models).
106. Selbst, supra note 88, at 134–35.
107. O’Neill, supra note 103, at 87.
108. See Ekow N. Yankah, Pretext and Justification: Republicanism, Policing, and Race, 40
CARDOZO L. REV. 1543, 1580-81 (2019) (noting that the enforcement of traffic violations runs the
risk of police officers exercising broad discretion to stop drivers for impermissible reasons such as
race).
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generated.109 A mountain of evidence demonstrates that race is one of those
variables.110 It has the capacity to shape everything about police practices,
from interactions between officers and citizens to law enforcement priorities.
Even if race is not the principle motivating factor, its influence is
reflected in law enforcement data. Machine learning algorithms, which learn
how to reproduce the data they are fed, will naturally reproduce that biased
data.111 Predictive systems, then, will identify people and locations that
reflect prior police interactions.112 Thus, despite the fact that “[n]one of the
algorithms use race in their model (and in fact strip it out) . . . the
technologies end up targeting communities of color.”113 In short, at best,
predictive policing tools premised on biased data will reflect that biased data,
reinforcing the discriminatory forces and race-based assumptions that
produced it in the first place.
To be clear, vendors of predictive policing tools, confronted with the
challenges of bad data, have made efforts to cleanse their products of the taint
of racism. In some instances, they have done so by relying on data points
that do not explicitly rely on race but correlate with it, like zip code or
economic status of a particular location.114 These efforts make the link
between racially tainted data and racially tainted forecasts feel, at first glance,
like more of a significant risk than a hard and fast reality.115 The assumption
is that if a vendor does not use a data point that is traditionally tied to race,
the forecasts produced by the technology will be non-racialized. This is
especially true of place-based predictive policing systems. One such vendor,
PredPol:
uses only 3 data points—crime type, crime location, and crime
date/time—to create its predictions. No personally identifiable
information is ever used. No demographic, ethnic or socioeconomic information is ever used. This eliminates the possibility
for privacy or civil rights violations seen with other intelligenceled or predictive policing models.116

109. Joh, supra note 82, at 297–301.
110. Balko, supra note 3 (detailing the influence of race and racism on the criminal legal system).
111. Id. at 300–01; see also supra notes 64–69 and accompanying text; Richardson et al., supra
note 71,at 192.
112. Joh, supra note 82, at 301.
113. Ferguson, supra note 81, at 516.
114. FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 75.
115. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Truth About Predictive Policing and Race, APPEAL (Dec.
7, 2017), https://theappeal.org/the-truth-about-predictive-policing-and-race-b87cf7c070b1/.
116. The Three Pillars of Predictive Policing, PREDPOL, https://www.predpol.com/lawenforcement/#predPolicing (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) (emphasis omitted).
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Hunchlab generates its forecasts from public reports of crime,
supplemented with data about the geography, weather patterns, and things
like the locations of community resources.117
Unfortunately, these efforts do not fully mitigate the risks of flawed
data. Patterns of reported crimes, like policing patterns and nearly everything
about the criminal legal system, vary by race.118 Tools that look to
community resources, like the locations of schools, restaurants, liquor
establishments, and transportation hubs119 have to contend with historical,
racialized patterns of residential segregation that have produced an uneven
geographical distribution of such establishments.120 For example, if a
correlation is drawn between criminal activity and community center
locations, and those centers are largely found in public housing residences

117. The CEO of the company which developed and sold Hunchlab in January 2019 detailed
their efforts to avoid running afoul of civil rights concerns:
“Forecast places, not people: We would forecast locations with the highest likelihood of
a crime at a given point in time. We do not attempt to make predictions about the actions
of people. Limit input data to places, not people: We would not use data about people –
no arrests, no social media, no gang status, no criminal background information.
Reported events: We would generate forecasts based on public reports of crime, not
arrests or other data originating in law enforcement activities. Supplement reported data:
One way to reduce bias is to draw on multiple sources of data. We knew that we could
generate forecasts using just the crime reports, but we believed that by supplementing
reported crimes with other relevant data, ideally from independent, open sources, we
could mitigate bias in the reporting data. Typical examples might include lighting, school
schedules, locations of community infrastructure, weather, or locations of bars.”
Robert
Cheetham,
Why
We
Sold
Hunchlab,
AZAVEA
(Jan.
23,
2019),
https://www.azavea.com/blog/2019/01/23/why-we-sold-hunchlab/.
118. Caroline Haskins, Academics Confirm Major Predictive Policing Algorithm is
Fundamentally Flawed, VICE (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/xwbag4/
academics-confirm-major-predictive-policing-algorithm-is-fundamentally-flawed; see also Balko
supra note 4 (reviewing studies that detail racial bias in the criminal legal system).
119. HunchLab: Under the Hood, AZAVEA 19–20 (2015), https://cdn.azavea.com/pdfs/
hunchlab/HunchLab-Under-the-Hood.pdf; see also Maurice Chammah, Policing the Future,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/02/03/policing-thefuture#.9vrCo3ZOH.
120. Deborah N. Archer, The New Housing Segregation: The Jim Crow Effects of Crime-Free
Housing Ordinances, 118 MICH. L. REV. 173, 185 (2019) (“Through exclusionary housing policies
that masquerade as race-neutral principles of rational planning and home rule, homogeneous
municipalities can, and do, act on their worst biases. Many local communities exercise their local
power to relegate poor people of color to marginalized, resource-starved neighborhoods, away from
the economic prosperity of their own communities.”); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW,
xvi (2017); see also Danyelle Solomon et. al., Systematic Inequality: Displacement, Exclusion, and
Segregation,
CTR.
FOR
AM.
PROGRESS
4,
10
(Aug.
2019),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/reports/2019/08/07/472617/systemic-inequalitydisplacement-exclusion-segregation/ (“Racial segregation has contributed to persistent disparities
in access to public goods—such as parks, hospitals, streetlights, and well-maintained roads—and
has undermined wealth building in communities of color nationwide.”).
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inhabited by communities of color, the tools will forecast crime to take place
in those locations.
At bottom, this is a case of garbage-in, garbage-out. Or as some call it,
“racism in, racism out.”121 The solutions most often posited to address flawed
data fall short. That is because no solution can fully erase the vulnerabilities
of racism, biases, and errors that are embedded in the information used by
these instruments to produce their forecasts.122 As we will see in the
following Section, which examines actuarial risk assessment tools and
pretrial justice, the problem of flawed data is just the first of several
overarching problems with these tools.
C. Algorithmic Tools and Pretrial Justice
1. Theory
For well over a half century, reformers have engaged in efforts to rethink
America’s pretrial justice system.123 In its modern form, pretrial justice is
best understood as the point in the system following arrest and coinciding
with a prosecutor’s charging decision. It is at that point when a judge must
make a decision about whether to detain an individual, release them from law
enforcement custody, or condition a person’s release from custody on
meeting an obligation, such as paying a monetary amount to ensure a return
to court. The origins of America’s pretrial system trace back over two
centuries ago to English common law, which presumed release for people
accused of noncapital crimes barring a serious risk of flight.124 Over the last
half century, the right to bail has evolved in the United States, incorporating
an additional consideration of the likelihood that the accused will pose a risk
to public safety.125

121. Stephanie Buranyi, Rise of the Racist Robots—How AI is Learning All of Our Worst
Impulses, GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/aug/08/riseof-the-racist-robots-how-ai-is-learning-all-our-worst-impulses (quoting Hamid Khan, an organizer
with the Stop LAPD Spying Coalition).
122. One solution proposed by researchers is “that every dataset be accompanied with a
datasheet that documents its motivation, composition, collection process, recommended uses . . .”
Timnit Gebru et al., Datasheets for Datasets, CORNELL UNIVERSITY, 1 (last revised Mar. 20, 2020)
(working paper), https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.09010v7.pdf. This solution has “the potential to
increase transparency and accountability . . . mitigate unwanted biases . . . and help researchers and
practitioners select more appropriate datasets for their chosen tasks.” Id. at 2. Nevertheless, it
“do[es] not provide a complete solution to mitigating unwanted biases or potential risks or harms.”
Id. at 10.
123. See Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 502–09 (2018)
(describing the development of pretrial justice since the 1960s).
124. Crystal Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1410–11 (2017).
125. Id. at 1412.
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Three waves of reform have driven the evolution of pretrial justice. 126
The first wave of reform, which provided the foundation for the current
pretrial justice regime, culminated in the Bail Reform Act of 1966, signed
into law by President Lyndon Johnson.127 The law was enacted largely in
response to a growing chorus of voices decrying the inequities in the system’s
operation. Judges tended to exercise discretion by setting unaffordable
money bail amounts that inevitably relegated the poor to pretrial detention.128
As then-Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy testified before a
Congressional committee:
[T]he rich man and the poor man do not receive equal justice in our
courts. And in no area is this more evident than in the matter of
bail. . . . [B]ail has become a vehicle for systematic injustice.
Every year in this country, thousands of persons are kept in jail for
weeks and even months following arrest. They are not yet proven
guilty. They may be no more likely to flee than you or I. But,
nonetheless, most of them must stay in jail because, to be blunt,
they cannot afford to pay for their freedom.129
The Bail Reform Act emphasized “the long-standing objective that bail
should be used solely to prevent flight risk,” imposing a presumption of
release unless doing so would undermine the chance that the accused would
not return to court.130
The presumption of release and focus on risk of flight shaped bail
decisions until the early-to-mid 1980s when concerns about public safety and
pretrial crime prompted a dramatic change and a second wave of reform.131
States passed laws that allowed for preventive detention—the pretrial
incarceration of those deemed too dangerous to society to be released.132
Despite efforts to upend preventive detention, which is rooted in the idea of
detaining individuals based on the possibility that they pose a danger to
public safety because they may commit some future offense while their
criminal case is pending, the Supreme Court upheld the more restrictive
126. See Mayson, supra note 123, at 502–09 (describing waves of bail reform).
127. Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3142, et seq.
128. Yang, supra note 124, at 1412–13.
129. Federal Bail Procedures: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights and
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Comm. on the Judiciary 88th Cong. 27(1964)
(statement of Hon. Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the United States) [hereinafter Bail
Legislation].
130. Yang, supra note 124, at 1413.
131. See Lauryn P. Goldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 B.Y.U. L. Rev.
837, 847–52 (2016) (describing shift in statutory language to consider dangerousness in bail
determinations); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742 (1987) (describing consideration of
dangerousness in federal bail statute as reaction to pretrial crime).
132. Yang, supra note 124, at 1413.
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pretrial regime in United States v. Salerno.133 Salerno marked a sea change
in pretrial justice, as states nationwide enacted bail legislation that allowed
courts to explicitly consider the danger the accused poses to the public.134
Bail reform has come full circle. The fear that drove the first wave of
bail reform—that wealth determined who would be freed pretrial—has
animated the latest series of reform efforts. Jurisdictions nationwide have
been prodded by litigation and advocacy to replace their cash-bail-based
pretrial systems with risk-based systems that employ algorithmic tools called
pretrial risk assessments to guide release and detention decisions.135 The
adoption and development of pretrial risk assessments was sparked half a
century ago by the Manhattan Bail Project, which consisted of a collaboration
between New York City’s criminal courts and the Vera Institute of Justice.136
The Manhattan Bail Project introduced the use of a formal questionnaire in
the pretrial process to elicit information about an accused’s personal
characteristics and family and community ties that could be assigned point
values in order to determine whom the courts could safely release pretrial
without bail.137 The data produced by the Vera effort:
[P]rovided objective factors to be used in setting release
conditions. Scoring each community link and requiring a threshold
score for release on one’s ‘own recognizance’ created a crude but
functional actuarial instrument for risk assessment, replacing the
essentially clinical judgment of a judge who set financial terms on
the basis of a holistic but subjective evaluation.138
Today, approximately forty jurisdictions in twenty-eight states use some
form of pretrial risk assessment instrument.139 Each of these tools aims to

133. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
134. Yang, supra note 124, at 1414–15.
135. Mayson, supra note 123, at 508–09.
136. Manhattan
Bail
Project,
VERA
INST.
OF
JUSTICE,
https://www.vera.org/publications/manhattan-bail-project-official-court-transcripts-october-1961june-1962 (last visited Mar. 13, 2021).
137. Preventive Detention in New York: From Mainstream to Margin and Back, CTR. ON THE
ADMIN. OF CRIM. L.
4–6 (2017), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/
upload_documents/2017-CACL-New-York-State-Bail-Reform-Paper.pdf.
Attorney General
Kennedy’s testimony previewed the current embrace of risk assessments, as his testimony before
Congress pointed to the regime put in place by the Manhattan Bail Project as an example of
successful bail reform efforts. Bail Legislation, supra note 129, at 4.
138. Jonathan Simon, Reversal of Fortune: The Resurgence of Individual Risk Assessment in
Criminal Justice, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397, 406 (2005).
139. Mayson, supra note 123, at 510; PRETRIAL JUST. INST., SCAN OF PRETRIAL PRACTICES
2019 25 (2019) [hereinafter SCAN OF PRETRIAL PRACTICES], https://university.pretrial.org/
viewdocument/scan-of-pretrial-practices-pji-20 (“[I]n 2017, approximately one in four people in
the United States lived in a jurisdiction that employed a validated evidence-based pretrial
assessment tool, up from one in 10 people in 2013.”).
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predict who, among the accused, is at risk of being rearrested or failing to
appear in court. Some jurisdictions developed these tools on their own, while
private corporations, foundations, academics, and data scientists developed
and designed others independently for adoption and use by a jurisdiction. 140
The factors assessed by the tools vary, but prior convictions and pending
charges are commonly utilized.141 A checklist tool—one that a pretrial
services agency or court authority administers and determines the presence
of a list of factors or characteristics—is the most widely used methodology.142
Statisticians analyze aggregated pretrial data to determine the characteristics
or traits of an accused person that most closely correlate with the outcome to
be assessed by the tool.143 Tool makers assign points to those characteristics
or traits—called risk factors—that correspond to the relationship between the
factor and the outcome. A risk score is calculated by determining which risk
factors apply to the individual being assessed and adding up that score.144
Some tools do not reveal the weights—or scores—assigned to individual
factors or reveal what factors are being taken into account.145 Though pretrial
tools weigh an individual’s risk of re-arrest and failure to appear, “[m]ost of
the existing instruments produce a single score that represents the risk of
either one occurring.”146
This merger of risks is problematic for a number of practical and policy
reasons. First, dangerousness and flight are distinct concerns that can lead to
pretrial detention. Accordingly, the Federal Bail Reform Act and the
majority of state bail statutes require that each phenomenon be considered
separately.147 In many states, while detention may be justified by the flight
140. An example of this bespoke design process is the effort undertaken by New York City’s
Criminal Justice Agency, which is responsible for managing the city’s pretrial justice system.
Release Assessment, N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY, https://www.nycja.org/release-assessment (last
visited Jan. 10, 2020).
141. Yang, supra note 124, at 1484.
142. See, e.g., supra note 139.
143. See Koepke & Robinson, supra note 30, at 1752–54 (describing how pretrial risk
assessments function); DESMARAIS & LOWDER, supra note 8 (describing different forms of pretrial
risk assessment and its basic mechanics).
144. Mayson, supra note 123, at 509.
145. E.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 763–64 (Wis. 2016) (requiring COMPAS to inform
courts when the company invokes the proprietary nature of its software to “prevent disclosure of
information relating to how factors are weighed or how risk scores are to be determined”). Further,
even among pre-trial risk assessment tools that do disclose their weights, many have not been
“validated” to show that the algorithm measures what it is intended to measure. Brandon Buskey
& Andrea Wood, Making Sense of Pre-trial Risk Assessments, CHAMPION 1, 18 (June 2018),
https://www.nacdl.org/Article/June2018-MakingSenseofPretrialRiskAsses.
Validation studies
often do not reveal how data points are weighted or what scores serve as cutoffs for different risk
levels. Id.
146. Mayson, supra note 123, at 509–10.
147. Goldin, supra note 131, at 872–84.
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risk one presents, a statutorily mandated separate finding is required to
actually impose detention.148 Different conditions of release—electronic
monitoring or a stay away order instead of cash bail—may flow from a
separate consideration of flight and dangerousness.149
From a policy standpoint, merging the two types of risk can lead to an
inadvertent overestimation of both. For example, mixing the two may mean
that a judge’s estimation of flight risk is tainted by fears of one’s risk of
dangerousness, while estimation of the risk of danger that one may pose may
be tainted by fears that someone poses a flight risk.150 Combining the two
forms of risk also prevents judges from understanding and accounting for the
importance of each risk on its own to their bail determinations.151
Notwithstanding the concerns that flow from combining risks, states
nationwide have adopted risk assessment instruments to inform pretrial
decision-making.152
2. Practice
As jurisdictions nationwide adopt pretrial algorithmic tools—
commonly known as pretrial risk assessment instruments—as part of their
reforms, the efficacy of the tools remains in question.153 At worst, they carry
the potential to reproduce disparity.154 At best, their introduction is
accompanied by decarceratory results without changing the racial

148. Id. at 873.
149. Id. at 881–85, 893–97.
150. Id. at 886–88.
151. Id. at 892–93.
152. See SCAN OF PRETRIAL PRACTICES, supra note 139, at 25; Matt Henry, Risk Assessment:
Explained, APPEAL (Mar. 25, 2019), https://theappeal.org/the-lab/explainers/risk-assessmentexplained (“Nearly every U.S. state and the federal system have implemented risk assessment in
some form.”).
153. Associated Press, Policy Group to Expand Research of Pretrial Risk Assessments,
ALBUQUERQUE J. (Apr. 25, 2018, 12:42 PM), https://www.abqjournal.com/1163146/policy-grouppushes-for-risk-assessment-to-score-defendants.html; David G. Robinson & Logan Koepke, Civil
Rights and Pretrial Risk Assessment Instruments, SAFETY AND JUST. CHALLENGE 3 (2019),
http://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Robinson-Koepke-CivilRights-Critical-Issue-Brief.pdf (“[T]he best available evidence . . . does not clearly establish the
impacts of these instruments: Although there is no evidence that they decrease public safety, it
remains unclear whether these tools typically cause substantial and lasting reductions in jailing.”).
154. Mayson, supra note 24, at 2251 (“[P]rediction functions like a mirror. The premise of
prediction is that, absent intervention, history will repeat itself. So what prediction does is identify
patterns in past data and offer them as projections about future events. If there is racial disparity in
the data, there will be racial disparity in prediction too. It is possible to replace one form of disparity
with another, but impossible to eliminate it altogether.”).
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disproportionality of a jurisdiction’s detained pretrial population. The
evidence of their effectiveness overall is exceedingly thin.155
New Jersey’s experience is instructive. The state virtually eliminated
cash bail in 2014 and overhauled its pretrial justice system entirely, moving
to a system focused on measuring and forecasting risk of failure to appear or
threat to public safety to guide judges’ pretrial detention decisions.156 Part of
that overhaul was the implementation of a pretrial risk assessment
instrument, the Public Safety Assessment (“PSA”), developed by the Laura
and John Arnold Foundation, now called Arnold Ventures.157 The PSA
examines nine so-called “risk factors” to assess the risk of new criminal
activity—specifically new violent criminal activity—along with the
likelihood of one’s failure to appear pending the resolution of their case.158
The factors assessed amount to the accused’s age at current arrest, criminal
history—including prior violent and nonviolent misdemeanor and felony
offenses—prior failures to appear, and prior carceral sentences.159
New Jersey’s turn to risk assessment was made in tandem with a host of
other changes to its pretrial system. Among those changes were: a
presumption that favors release on nonmonetary conditions over monetary
bail; a narrowing of the grounds on which the accused can be detained
pretrial; and a requirement that a prosecutor file a detention motion and

155. Stevenson, supra note 24, at 341 (“[T]here is a sore lack of research on the impacts of risk
assessment in practice. There is no evidence on how the use of risk assessment affects racial
disparities. There is no evidence that the adoption of risk assessment has led to dramatic
improvements in either incarceration rates or crime without adversely affecting the other margin.”).
Stevenson’s research demonstrated that the implementation of bail reform measures in Kentucky
that included the use of a pretrial risk assessment produced limited decarceratory results and no
effect on racial disparity:
[T]he net effects on the overall release rate were small. Furthermore, they were not
permanent: the sharp change in practices and outcomes that occurred right after the law
was implemented eroded over time as judges returned to their previous bail-setting
practices. Within a couple of years, the pretrial release rate was lower than it was before
the bill, and lower than the national average. . . . Once county effects were taken into
account, racial disparities remain constant throughout the time period of the analysis.
Id. at 309.
156. Lisa W. Foderaro, New Jersey Alters Its Bail System and Upends Legal Landscape, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/nyregion/new-jersey-bailsystem.html.
157. See generally APPR Vision and Mission, APPR, https://www.psapretrial.org/about/factors
(last visited Jan. 8, 2020).
158. Public Safety Assessment: New Jersey Risk Factor Definitions, N.J. CTS. 1, 1–4 (Dec. 2018)
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/psariskfactor.pdf?cacheID=jkRmwcV.
159. Id.
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overcome—at a hearing—a rebuttable presumption of release by a showing
of clear and convincing evidence that detention is warranted.160
These changes brought with them significant reductions in New Jersey’s
pretrial population, leading the state to incarcerate 6,000 fewer people pretrial
in 2018 as compared to 2012.161 That is a noteworthy and commendable
reduction. Yet racial disparities in bail decisions persist.162 According to a
2018 report conducted by New Jersey’s Administrative Office of the Courts,
Black males continue to be overrepresented in the pretrial incarceration
populations, despite the extensive pretrial reforms—and reductions in pretrial
incarceration—initiated by the state’s overhaul of its criminal legal system.163
Thus, while the number of Black women who are incarcerated pretrial fell
from 44% to 34% from 2012 to 2018, Black men still comprise more than
50% of the state’s incarcerated population.164 And it failed to rectify racial
disparities in pretrial detention generally.165
The PSA undoubtedly played some role in the reduction of the pretrial
population; the presence of simultaneous, significant reforms makes it
impossible to measure just how much of a role the PSA played. That is
because the PSA is often adopted in conjunction with a host of other pretrial
reforms, obscuring what has produced results.166
Since the tools have been implemented and expanded rapidly over a
short period of time, little data is available to determine their efficacy or
fairness.167 However, even if these data points were readily accessible,
160. ACLU of N.J. et al., The New Jersey Pretrial Justice Manual, NAT’L ASSOC. CRIM. DEF.
LAWS. 1, 23–30 (Dec. 2016), https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/50e0c53b-6641-4a79-8b49c733def39e37/the-new-jersey-pretrial-justice-manual.pdf.
161. Roman Gressier, Racial Disparities in NJ Bail Persist Despite Reforms: Report, CRIME
REP. (Apr. 4, 2019), https://thecrimereport.org/2019/04/04/racial-disparities-in-nj-bail-persistdespite-reforms-report/.
162. Id.
163. Glenn A. Grant, Report to the Governor and the Legislature, N.J. CTS. 1, 8 (Apr. 2019),
https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2018cjrannual.pdf?c=taP.
164. See Gressier, supra note 161; Joe Hernandez, N.J. Officials Finally Release Data on Bail
Reform. Their Conclusion? It’s Working., WHYY (Apr. 2, 2019), https://whyy.org/articles/n-jofficials-have-finally-released-data-on-bail-reform-their-conclusion-its-working. Glenn A. Grant,
Report to the Governor and the Legislature, N.J. CTS. 1, 21 (2019),
https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/cjrannualreport2019.pdf?c=NF1 (noting that 55% of the
New Jersey jail population is Black and that the “demographic distribution of male inmates is similar
to the total population”).
165. Gressier, supra note 161.
166. See SOUTHERLAND, supra note 11, at 9 (highlighting remarks from Kristin Bechtel at the
Arnold Foundation, which launched the PSA, explaining that the tool “was just one element of a
package of changes”); see also The Impact, MOVEMENT ALL. PROJECT (last visited June 1, 2021),
https://pretrialrisk.com/the-impact/ (describing the limited impact of pretrial risk assessments).
167. Buskey & Wood, supra note 145 (highlighting a lack of validation studies and problems
with existing validation effort).
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pretrial risk assessments—like all actuarial criminal legal system tools—
raise a more fundamental concern about decision-making in the criminal
legal system. The individual who often matters most after the accused is the
person deciding their fate. These tools tend to ignore that decisionmaker.
3. Critique: Looking in All the Wrong Places
The desire to reduce the pretrial detention population and to address
unwarranted racial disparities are the oft-stated motivations that animate the
introduction and use of algorithmic tools in pretrial decision-making.168
These goals are commendable. The thinking behind them finds root in
optimism: If judges could just choose the right people to detain or set free,
we would have a fairer, less biased system.169 It is also logical. Ultimately,
judges are the ones who make the decisions that lead to a robust, racially
disparate, predominately poor pretrial population. Unfortunately, there is
little evidence to suggest that algorithmic tools, alone and as currently
constructed, can meet the laudable goals and optimism that often drives their
use.170 Critiques abound explaining why and how the tools fall short from a
practical and civil rights perspective.171

168. DESMARAIS & LOWDER, supra note 8; Sarah Picard et al., Beyond the Algorithm: Pretrial
Reform, Risk Assessment, and Racial Fairness, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION 1, 3–4 (2019),
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2019/Beyond_The_Algorith
m.pdf; Nuefeld, supra note 12.
169. Sarah Brayne & Angele Christin, Technologies of Crime Prediction: The Reception of
Algorithms in Policing and Criminal Courts, SOC. PROBS., Mar. 2020, at 1, 3, 13; Nuefeld, supra
note 12; Bail Reform, ARNOLD VENTURES, https://www.arnoldventures.org/work/release-decisionmaking/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
170. See Hill, supra note 27 (analyzing the risks of algorithmic tools for racial justice); see also
Ethan Corey, New Data Suggests Risk Assessment Tools Have Little Impact on Pretrial
Incarceration, APPEAL (Feb. 7, 2020), https://theappeal.org/new-data-suggests-risk-assessmenttools-have-little-impact-on-pretrial-incarceration (describing failures across jurisdictions); Henry,
supra note 152 (analyzing the pitfalls of risk assessment tools and why organizers oppose using
them).
171. For example, twenty-seven researchers, scholars, and advocates signed an open statement
of concern—submitted to California and Missouri—regarding the use of actuarial risk assessment
as a means of lowering pretrial jail populations. Chelsea Barbaras et al., Technical Flaws of Pretrial
Risk Assessments Raise Grave Concerns, MIT MEDIA LAB (July 17, 2019),
https://damprod.media.mit.edu/x/2019/07/16/TechnicalFlawsOfPretrial_ML%20site.pdf; see also
Koepke & Robinson, supra note 30, at 1750; Mayson, supra note 24, at 2227–51 (describing the
equality tradeoffs of algorithmic risk assessment instruments). See Robinson & Koepke, supra note
153, at 3–9 (describing the civil rights concerns raised by algorithmic pretrial risk assessments
tools); THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS, THE USE OF PRETRIAL
“RISK ASSESSMENT” INSTRUMENTS: A SHARED STATEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS CONCERNS (2018),
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/criminal-justice/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-Full.pdf (describing civil
rights concerns raised by algorithmic risk assessments); Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias,
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-
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One rarely explored reason is that the tools themselves do little to shape
or change the behavior of the actors who are ultimately making decisions in
ways that would reduce pretrial detention or confront racism in the criminal
legal system. That is because the tools are aimed at the accused rather than
the people making decisions about them. They are designed to forecast what
those individuals might do in light of their prior history as constructed by the
world around them and unique characteristics.172 Further, the instrument
correlates those factors to what others have done in the past. The focus is
entirely on the individual before the court. Wholly absent from the frame is
what decisionmakers in the system have or have not done in the past when
faced with a particular decision point, set of facts, or series of allegations.173
In other words, there are no risk assessment instruments in use that purport
to measure the decision-making of actors within the system by examining the
behavior of those actors.
In part, that is because our own biases about systemic reform and the
limits of politics and the law have stifled our imagination around points of
potential intervention, particularly when it comes to pretrial justice. We
understand that racial disparity exists. We concede that our jails hold a
racially disparate share of poor people and people of color in pretrial
detention.174 We also presume that if we provide judges enough data about
those individuals, they will make fairer, racially just decisions.
Yet that framing ignores a key measure of disparity: the actual behavior
of actors in the system. Research has demonstrated that implicit and explicit
bias plays a significant role in decision-making throughout the criminal legal
system, and in particular in bail determinations.175 Judges, like anyone else,
are subject to biases that shape their decisions.176 The fact that people of
color are treated worse than their white counterparts at every stage of the
criminal legal system is not solely a reflection of the behavior of those
individuals or indicative of the things they are accused of having done.
Rather, that disparity in treatment flows from the biased judgments of
in-criminal-sentencing (describing how an algorithmic risk assessment erroneously overestimated
the risk posed by Black people while underestimating the risk posed by their white counterparts).
172. See Henry, supra note 152 (describing how risk assessment algorithms predict outcomes).
173. See Desmarais & Lowder, supra note 8 (describing the descriptive factors used most
commonly by algorithmic tools, which do not include information about the decisionmaker).
174. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/factsheets/pie2019_allimages.pdf.
175. Cynthia E. Jones, “Give Us Free”: Addressing Racial Disparities In Bail Determinations,
16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 919, 939–44 (2013).
176. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1148, 1150–
52 (2013) (describing the influence of implicit bias on criminal justice decision-making); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinksi et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1195, 1208 (2009) (same).

520

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:487

powerful system actors about who poses a danger and who does not, who will
likely return and who will not. Thus, even if tools were able to precisely
forecast what an individual may do while awaiting disposition of their case,
there is no way to ensure that the same biases that shape decision-making
now would disappear altogether or cease to play an outsized role in decisionmaking regardless of the forecast.
Indeed, one study of the adoption and implementation of algorithmic
tools in the criminal legal system documented professional resistance by
judges and prosecutors to the adoption of tools.177 The study also found that,
far from correcting the biased exercise of discretion, “predictive algorithms
in fact displace[] discretion to less visible parts” of the criminal legal system,
such that “legal professionals manipulate the data at their disposal to regain
the autonomy that they feel is being threatened by the adoption of . . . [new]
technologies.”178 Shifts in discretion just lead to “new increases in
discriminatory behaviors.”179
Pretrial risk assessments currently in use track the concerns relevant to
statutes governing pretrial release—one’s risk of flight or the potential that
an individual might be rearrested.180
Being tethered to statutory
considerations at the expense of any other inquiries limits their overall utility.
They do not forecast the risk of being wrongfully detained or having bail set
too high by a particular judge. They do not tell us whether a prosecutor’s
office unjustly but consistently seeks detention or bail for those they charge
with crimes. Nor have they been used to provide any real insights about
judicial behavior. In a regime grounded on evidence-based practices, there
is little—if any—inquiry about the evidence that judges (or other criminal
legal system actors) are behaving in unbiased ways or imposing pretrial
conditions that comport with justice.
Given what we know, the consequences of ignoring the behavior of
system actors are significant. First, it ensures that we will continue to focus
177. Brayne & Christin, supra note 169, at 7–10; see also Stevenson, supra note 21, at 341–69
(evaluating how Kentucky judges used risk assessment instruments).
178. Brayne & Christin, supra note 169, at 13.
179. Id. at 14.
180. Koepke & Robinson, supra note 30, at 1752–54. Those concerns include things like one’s
ties to a community because of stable employment, a steady address, a history of failures to appear
in court, prior criminal history, the nature and character of prior criminal convictions, pending or
current charges, age, and marital status. Sarah L. Desmarais, et al., Predictive Validity of Pretrial
Risk Instruments: A Systematic Review of the Literature, J. CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. (on file with
author); see also Community Justice Exchange, an Organizer’s Guide to Confronting Pretrial Risk
Assessment Tools in Decarceration Campaigns, CMTY. JUST. EXCH. 36–41 (Dec. 2019),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5ba95e4c51f4d408d6784c85/t/5defce44bdfdf024df3b87f8/1
575997003585/CJE_PretrialRATGuide_FinalDec2019Version.pdf (detailing variables commonly
considered by algorithmic risk assessments).
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on those being consumed by the system while failing to scrutinize the system
and those who make the decisions that produce harm and burden the accused.
Second, a system that fails to engage in critical self-evaluation and corrective
behavior undermines any faith that we can put in reform efforts. We rightly
expect those convicted of crimes to reflect on their behavior and change it for
the better. Our failure to expect the same of system actors undermines the
integrity of the system itself.
D. Algorithmic Tools and Sentencing
1. Theory
Over the last two decades, jurisdictions nationwide have adopted
algorithmic risk assessment tools to guide sentencing decisions.181 The shift
to the use of these tools to assist sentencing decisions finds root in a larger
movement of to engage in evidence-based practices to make the criminal
legal system “smart, rather than tough, on crime.”182 Criminal legal systems
have embraced these tools largely on the hope that they can distinguish
between people who pose a high or low risk of reoffending with greater
precision and, in turn, foster a more efficient and effective allocation of
limited sentencing resources.183
These tools first emerged in the 1920s as guides to assist parole
decision-making.184 Correctional authorities used them to shape the
administration of punishment and to help identify the correctional
interventions one should receive if incarcerated or under some form of
supervision.185 University of Chicago Professor Ernest Burgess was among
the first to develop a risk assessment instrument, designed to predict an
individual’s likelihood of success on parole based on an examination of

181. Brandon L. Garrett, Evidence-Informed Criminal Justice, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV 1490,
1514 (2018) (noting that “an increasing number of states use risk-based instruments to inform
decisionmaking at sentencing” and that the use of these tools has been countenanced and encouraged
by state supreme courts and statutes.); Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. L.J. 57, 63 (2018)
(recounting the growth in use of algorithmic tools at sentencing)
182. Collins, supra note 181; see also Barkow, supra note 10, at 1619 (describing the sentencing
guidelines regime as arising out of “dissatisfaction with discretionary and indeterminate sentencing
regimes that focused too much on individualization and not enough on avoiding unjust disparities”).
183. Dawinder Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 673 (2015).
184. Richard A. Berk & Justin Bleich, Statistical Procedures for Forecasting Criminal
Behavior: A Comparative Assessment, 12 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 513, 513 (2013).
185. Collins, supra note 181, at 79–80.
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twenty-one factors.186 A competing tool, developed by criminologists at
Harvard Law School, narrowed the number of predictive factors to seven.187
Despite their label, sentencing risk assessments were not intended to
determine sentence length.188 Instead, they generally were:
[C]reated to guide decisions about how to administer punishment,
not about how much punishment is due. In fact, the social
scientists who developed the tools that are being incorporated into
sentencing decisions expressly disavow their use to “assist in
establishing the just penalty,” specifically in decisions about
whether to incarcerate and the length of the sentence.189
Nevertheless, they inform a judge’s decision about the length of a
person’s sentence; they also shape judgments about where an incarceratory
sentence will be served, whether the sentence will include supervision, or
some form of diversion.190
Sentencing risk assessment instruments have become a common feature
of the presentence investigation. Presentence authorities—often within the
organizational confines of the court system—typically administer the
instrument during a presentence investigation and provide the results to the
court, defense counsel, the prosecution, and the person facing judgment as a
data point to be considered when fashioning an appropriate sentence. These
instruments generally seek to forecast one future outcome. They look to
quantify the risk that someone will reoffend in some way that undermines
public safety.191 This consideration of future dangerousness and public safety
risk at sentencing has been endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court and has
become essential to criminal sentencing.192
The development of sentencing risk assessment instruments follows a
familiar process. Constructing an algorithmic tool of this sort requires first
collecting “data on people charged or convicted of crimes in the past as a
base population.”193 Data sources vary, but generally draw from observations
of those released from prison or those referred to probation or some other

186. Harcourt, supra note 30, at 58; see also Berk & Bleich, supra note 184, at 513 (citing
Professor Burgess’s study as one example of predictive tools dating back to the 1920s).
187. Harcourt, supra note 30, at 61. The criminologists, professor Sheldon Gleuck and research
assistant Eleanor Gleuck, arrived at seven factors to refine their tool to a narrow set of factors, and
in turn, fewer predictive variables, guided by their research and data collection. Id. at 60–62.
188. Collins, supra note 181, at 61.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 67–71.
191. Id.
192. Garrett, supra note 181, at 1513–14.
193. Jessica Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 73 (2017).
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form of supervision.194 It also may come from different geographic locations
from the venue of the sentencing at issue as well—different regions of a state,
the United States, and, in some instances, other countries.195 Designers then
undertake to define recidivism—whether that is an arrest, an arrest plus a
formal charge, a final adjudication, or some other conduct.196 Tool
developers then create a statistical model to identify factors that bear a
statistically significant correlation with recidivism.197 That model is the
framework for the actuarial risk assessment tool.
Ultimately, the number of factors varies with each instrument, but,
generally, they “consider ‘static’ factors that the [person to be sentenced] can
do nothing about (like prior crimes or age) and ‘dynamic’ risk factors that
[may change over time] (like substance abuse or impulsivity).”198 Most
include consideration of four categories of factors: (1) criminal history, (2)
antisocial attitude, (3) demographics, and (4) socio-economic status.199 Like
pretrial risk assessments, sentencing risk assessments produce a numerical
score by evaluating whether an individual possesses certain risk factors—
such as criminal history, socio-economic status, mental health status and
history, marital status, and a range of demographic features.200 That
information may be collected through a structured interview with the person
to be assessed, by way of a questionnaire to be completed voluntarily by the
person to be sentenced, or, in some instances, through publicly accessible
data about the individual.201 The score is associated with a category of
recidivism risk—usually low, medium, or high.202
The character, nature, and accuracy of the prediction varies with the
algorithmic tools used.203 So too does the level of transparency of the factors
considered by the tool and the weight given to them. 204 Thus, there is no
standard level of offense or type of recidivism that these tools measure—
serious violence or minor criminal behavior may be among the predictive
194. Id. at 74.
195. Id. at 74–75.
196. Id. at 75–76.
197. Id. at 78–79.
198. .Christopher Slobogin, Principles of Risk Assessment: Sentencing and Policing, 15 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 583, 584–86 (2018).
199. Eaglin, supra note 193, at 83.
200. See Slobogin, supra note 198, at 584–86 (describing three statistically driven risk
assessment instruments that are representative of sentencing risk assessments). Tool designers
determine “which predictive factors observed in the statistical model” used to construct the
algorithmic tool will ultimately be included in the tool. Eaglin, supra note 193 at 81–88.
201. Eaglin, supra note 193, at 85.
202. Eaglin, ’supra note 31, at 92.
203. Slobogin, supra note 198, at 587–92.
204. Garrett, supra note 181, at 1515.
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outputs.205 Nor is there a standard temporal limit on when reoffense may
occur.206 Some tools address risk management—what is needed to prevent
recidivism—while others only produce a recidivism risk forecast.207
Notwithstanding the fact that “predicting more serious offenses is more
challenging than predicting low-risk offenders,”208 proponents of algorithmic
tools at sentencing posit that they regularly outperform human judgments
alone.209 Proponents also claim that the tools will “increase public safety by
reducing recidivism. . . . increase[] the accuracy of decisions judges are
already making. . . . [and benefit] the public, who save money while avoiding
future victimization” and people convicted of crimes who avoid
incarceration.210 A look at the tools in practice tells a different story.
2. Practice
As with algorithmic tools in policing and the pretrial system,211
algorithmic sentencing tools have not fully delivered the desired results of
less biased sentencing or reductions in recidivism.212 Indeed, a recent
empirical study of Virginia’s use of algorithmic tools at sentencing provides
insights about the wide gulf between the theoretical promise these

205. Slobogin, supra note 198, at 587; see also Collins, supra note 181, at 64–65, 107
(explaining that tools vary in the type of recidivism they predict—from rearrest to conviction, to
reconviction for any offense, including a misdemeanor, felony, or violation of court-imposed
supervision).
206. Slobogin, supra note 198, at 587–88.
207. Id. at 588.
208. Garrett, supra note 181, at 1515.
209. Id. at 1514; see also John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting
Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 408 (2006) (explaining that
“[t]he general superiority of actuarial over clinical risk assessment in the behavioral sciences has
been known for half a century”). The debate on accuracy of the tools is not over. A 2018 Dartmouth
College study found that people responding to an online survey were able to predict risk about as
well as the COMPAS risk assessment. Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and
Limits of Predicting Recidivism, SCI. ADVANCES, Jan. 17, 2018, at 1, 3; Collins, supra note 181, at
95.
210. Collins, supra note 181, at 72.
211. See Huq, supra note 11, at 1074–85 (describing the widespread use of algorithmic and
actuarial tools in sentencing and noting that it is “‘improbable’ that that any convicted felon, whether
an adult or juvenile, would be sentenced today without the aid of some sort of actuarial risk
instrument, albeit not necessarily one that employs algorithmic means.”) (internal citations omitted).
212. See id. at 1049, 1052 (explaining that actuarial sentencing fosters incarceration and
incapacitation, undermining efforts to curb recidivism through rehabilitation and the provision of
services; that even the best instruments are wrong at least 30% of the time; and that fiscal savings
are difficult to calculate and often outweighed by the human costs of inaccurate predictions and
unnecessary incarceration); Sonja Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific
Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 806, 842 (2014) (noting that actuarial risk
assessment does not provide anything close to a precise prediction of individual risks).
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instruments hold and the way they operate in practice.213 Critically, the study
marks “the first evaluation of how risk assessment at sentencing affects
outcomes relative to the status quo.”214 As relevant here, one of the Virginia
tools studied was used in conjunction with sentencing guidelines to divert
low-risk people convicted of nonviolent offenses from jail or prison.215
The results of the study encapsulate the difficulties algorithmic tools
face in meeting the promise their proponents believe they hold. In short,
“Virginia’s nonviolent risk assessment reduced neither incarceration nor
recidivism; its use disadvantaged a vulnerable group (the young); and failed
to reduce racial disparities.”216
Although sentences for those with high risk scores increased and those
with low risk scores decreased, there was scant evidence that the tool yielded
a reduction in recidivism.217 The instrument suggested that judges should
have imposed lengthier sentences on young people than were actually being
imposed on youth,218 meaning that if judges followed the tool’s
recommendations, there would have been an increase in sentences for young
people. Nevertheless, the tool did lead to a slightly greater chance of
incarceration for young people and an increase in sentence length for
youth.219
Racial disparities in sentencing were largely unchanged by the tool,
though Black people scored substantially higher—and therefore riskier—
than their white counterparts.220 Racial disparities grew in courts where the
tool was viewed as the most influential, largely due to the tendency of judges
to exercise more leniency for white people with high risk scores than for
Black people with high risk scores.221
This study also shed light on the role of discretion by judges when given
an algorithmic tool. Among the findings were that judges were three
percentage points less likely to divert Black people in the highest risk

213. Megan T. Stevenson & Jennifer L. Doleac, Algorithmic Risk Assessment in the Hands of
Humans 1, 5 (Nov. 18, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3489440.
214. Id. at 5.
215. Id. at 2.
216. Id. at 5. The study’s authors provide a number of possible explanations for this set of
results. Among those explanations are the exercise of discretion by sentencing judges whose
decisions are shaped by a host of factors; judges gaining familiarity with the forecasts that a risk
instrument produces; the willingness of a judge to consult an algorithmic tool; and the way judges
make use of the information conveyed by the algorithmic tool. Id. at 22–29
217. Id. at 2.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 3.
220. Id. at 2.
221. Id.

526

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:487

category out of the formal system than white people in the same category.222
Judges also chose whether to follow or deviate from the algorithmic tool
when factors like race, gender, or socioeconomic status were at play—factors
that shaped the judge’s view of the person before the court and the
circumstances that led them into the criminal legal system.223 Judicial
discretion actually minimized the significant increase in the chances of
incarceration for a young person that would have resulted from a faithful
adherence to the instrument’s forecast.224 At the same time, judges who used
the algorithmic tools the most were also more likely to be more lenient to
white people with high risk scores than they were with Black people who
similarly scored high risk.225
These real-world consequences highlight the challenges that come with
the development and implementation of algorithmic tools. They also
underscore the very real difficulty of forecasting an individual’s future based
on what we know about other individuals. More to the point, they underscore
the shortcomings of profiling.
3. Critique: Racial Profiling 2.0?
By nature, algorithmic tools produce their risk scores by analyzing
group-level data that correlates with certain types of behavior of interest to a
decisionmaker.226 The tools then assign a score that approximates the
relationship between the characteristics possessed by the group and the
behavior engaged in by members of the group.227 The similarity between the
individual being assessed and the group from which the data is drawn
produces a forecast of what an individual may do. In other words, the tools
“ascribe a blanket risk profile to all individuals in a group,” recommending
treatment based on an individual’s association with a group.228 Thus, the
tools rank people convicted of crimes “according to likelihood of engaging
in criminal behavior based on the behavior of the individuals in the
222. Id. at 25.
223. Id. at 26.
224. Id. at 27.
225. Id. at 29. Another study of Virginia’s Nonviolent Risk Assessment (“NVRA”) revealed an
additional concern. The tool was developed with the stated goal of identifying people convicted of
nonviolent crimes at the lowest risk of recidivism for diversion from prison. Brandon Garrett &
John Monahan, Assessing Risk: The Use of Risk Assessment in Sentencing, 103 JUDICATURE,
SUMMER 2019, at 42, 45 (2019). A review of sentencing data from 2016 concerning the use of the
NVRA by judges in diversion decisions revealed that “many—indeed, most—defendants eligible
for [ ] alternative sentences did not receive them.” Id.
226. See Nicholas, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
227. See Eaglin, supra note 193, at 85–88 (describing how sentencing algorithmic tools are
designed and constructed).
228. Sidhu, supra note 183, at 702.
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underlying data set.”229 In that sense, actuarial risk assessments operate as a
form of digital profiling, prescribing the treatment of an individual based on
their similarity to, or membership in, a group. Forecasts based on actuarial
data provide us with insights about groups of people but reveal far less about
individuals.230 When it comes to sentencing, the tools become a way of
asking whether the person before the court is more, less, or equally dangerous
as a group of people based solely on the statistical similarities between the
group and the individual.231
Such an approach is troubling, to say the least. Treating someone in a
specific way because they share the characteristics of a group is the essence
of profiling.232 Such conduct offends an axiomatic principle that cuts across
the criminal legal system and bears particular significance at sentencing:
individuals should be treated as individuals, not based on their membership
in, or shared characteristics with, a particular group.233 Put differently, “our
criminal law punishes people for what they do, not who they are.”234 That
edict carries even more weight when one considers the fact that sentencing
risk assessments, by potentially suggesting a lengthier term of incarceration
based on a rough forecast that one may recidivate, are in essence punishing
individuals not only for crimes they have not yet committed but for anything
they may ever do at any point in the future.
Since actuarial sentencing takes root in the toxic soil of profiling and
encourages the analysis of characteristics that correlate with recidivism, it
necessarily drives judges to consider factors that may have nothing to do with
culpability.235 Actuarial risk assessments not only “incorporate a range of
non-culpable characteristics into their calculations, most of [them]
229. Eaglin, supra note 193, at 85.
230. Brian Netter, Using Group Statistics to Sentence Individual Criminals: An Ethical and
Statistical Critique of the Virginia Risk Assessment Program, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699,
714 (2007) (explaining that “[s]tatistical predictions speak to group tendencies, not individual
proclivities”)
231. Sidhu, supra note 183, at 675.
232. Profiling, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The practice or an instance of
using particular information about someone or something to infer other probable characteristic.”).
233. Sidhu, supra note 183, at 702–03 (explaining that punishment is to be inflicted because of
one’s conduct, not group membership). The Supreme Court surfaced this concern in Batson v.
Kentucky, which set forth a framework to address racial discrimination in jury selection. 476 U.S.
79 (1986). The Court explained that its concern rested on the notion that prosecutors were making
decisions about who to strike from juries based on their race and alleged resultant affinity for a
particular group, rather than on an individualized consideration of their fitness as a juror. Id. at 87–
88.
234. Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 766 (2017).
235. Collins, supra note 181, at 103–04; see also Eaglin, supra note 31, at 99 (explaining that
predictive analytics weighs factors that fall outside an individual’s control, exposing “[t]ensions
regarding what counts at sentencing and the meaning of fairness.”).
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omit . . . the crime for which the [convicted person] is being punished.”236
Thus, the risk assessment suggests a punishment that does not reflect a
consideration of the crime of conviction, but instead relies on factors such as
one’s gender, education, employment history, and mental health status.237
This raises yet another profiling-related concern. It is not hard to
imagine a host of other factors that are deemed relevant to sentencing through
the lens of an actuarial risk assessment because they are correlated with
recidivism.238
Such factors may also be associated with distinct
disadvantages faced by communities of color.239 For example, imagine a
sentencing risk assessment that considers one’s zip code, level of education,
marital status, familial ties, and parental criminality. Given the way
structural inequality influences life outcomes along racial lines, all of these
factors unfairly disadvantage Black people facing sentencing.240
That is problematic for at least two reasons. First, it perpetuates racially
disparate treatment at sentencing. People with what are considered negative
characteristics will be viewed as recidivism risks and will therefore warrant
harsher treatment. If those people happen to be Black, racially disparate
treatment will be the result. Second, it forces those who rely on risk
assessment to equate correlation with causation. In doing so, decisionmakers
must forgo consideration of context and nuance—the reasons why the
individual before the court may be different from all those who previously
appeared for sentencing. The result is a sentencing regime that either
punishes a person or dispenses mercy based on who they are in comparison
to others, rather than what brought the individual before the court, what they
did, and who they might become in the future with or without the intervention
of a criminal sanction.241

236. Collins, supra note 181, at 103. One example of incorporating nonculpable characteristics
is the consideration of marital status as it relates to recidivism. Marital status may connote less time
spent outside of the house, which is the true predictor of recidivism. If an instrument only considers
marital status, but does not consider time outside of the home, the use of the correlated variable
(marital status) in the instrument instead of the true variable (time outside the house), means that
those single people who do not spend time outside the house will be scored riskier because they are
not married, even though as an individual, they may be less risky. Netter, supra note 230, at 715.
237. Collins, supra note 181, at 104–05. This is a variation on the flawed data as destiny,
garbage in, garbage out critique detailed. See supra Section I.B.3.
238. Sidhu, supra note 183, at 702.
239. Eaglin, supra note 31, at 95–97.
240. Id. at 96–97.
241. Collins, supra note 181, at 107 (noting that those who benefit from actuarial sentencing
benefit because of “‘’ their “relative privilege” in the form of “access to educational and
employment opportunities, [and] a low-crime zip code. . . .”); see also Sidhu, supra note 183, at
707–10 (explaining that risk assessments “demand punishment for a group identity over which the
individual has no meaningful control”).
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To be sure, actors throughout the criminal legal system use anecdotal,
qualitative, or quantitative data about groups to make judgments about
individuals. The routine nature of the practice does not make it less troubling.
Saddling judgments about individuals with the behaviors and actions of
others who may be similarly situated by age at first arrest, marital status,
employment status, or their prior involvement with the criminal legal system
raises concerns about equity and justice that are unique when one’s freedom
is on the line.242 Most would agree that a just criminal legal system requires
those sitting in judgment of the accused to undertake a holistic consideration
of the person before them, weighing factors for which an algorithm may not
account.243 Judging people based on their associations with data points flies
in the face of the notion of an individualized evaluation of the person standing
before the court.
The problem with profiling is highlighted both by the robust debate over
the differing measures of fairness of algorithmic risk assessment instruments
and the impact that such judgments can have on individuals. In 2016, the
news organization ProPublica investigated the accuracy of risk assessment
scores used in pretrial decision-making in Broward County, Florida.244 They
examined the risk scores of more than 7,000 Broward County arrestees from
2013 and 2014 to evaluate how many arrested people would be charged with
new crimes over the next two years.245 What their investigation uncovered
was nothing short of breathtaking. Unreliable forecasts of violent crime were
the instrument’s hallmark: only 20% of those predicted to commit violent
crimes went on to do so.246 The faulty forecasts not only carried serious racial
disparities but also inaccurate predictions of who posed a risk of future
criminality. Black people were falsely labeled as future criminals at nearly
twice the rate of their white counterparts, while white people were mislabeled
as low risk more often than their Black counterparts.247
ProPublica foreclosed the possibility that these disparities could result
from prior criminal history, age, and gender. Even after controlling for those
variables, “Black defendants were still 77% more likely to be pegged as at
242. Netter, supra note 230, at 714.
243. See Caryn Devins et al., The Law and Big Data, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 357, 396
(2017) (explaining that just sentencing requires judicial discretion to “consider the individual
holistically, to weigh the competing purposes of sentencing, and to consider factors not accounted
for by the Guidelines. In other words, the “frame” of sentencing determinations is fluid and requires
case-by-case evaluations. The variables that were important in one sentencing proceeding may be
less influential in another. These types of discretionary determinations are inherently not reducible
to rigid criteria or models.”).
244. Angwin et al., supra note 156.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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higher risk of committing a future violent crime and 45% more likely to be
predicted to commit a future crime of any kind.”248
Northpointe, the company responsible for the risk assessment
instrument that produced those scores, rejected ProPublica’s analysis.249 In
doing so, Northpointe argued that the tools they constructed were racially
neutral because Black and white people who were labeled high risk were
rearrested at the same rates.250 Thus, Northpointe claimed, the tool accurately
sorted individuals without regard to race.251
The debate between ProPublica and Northpointe252 raises a point about
measuring fairness and equity that illuminates the profiling concern.253 Each
entity is examining notions of fairness and equality through a different set of
lenses. For ProPublica’s part, the measure of fairness that matters most is
error rate balance. Under that rubric, the fairness of the tool depends on
preventing any single group or individual from bearing the burden of the
mistakes made by the risk assessment instrument.254 From Northpointe’s
perspective, the fact that when an individual is labeled high risk, they are

248. Id.
249. WILLIAM DIETERICH ET AL., COMPAS Risk Scales: Demonstrating Accuracy Equity and
Predictive
Parity, NORTHPOINTE RESEARCH DEPT.
1,
2 (July
8,
2016),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2998391-ProPublica-Commentary-Final070616.html.
250. Id. at 2–3.
251. Id. at 11–13; Eaglin, supra note 193, at 97.
252. See, e.g., Laurel Eckhouse et al., Layers of Bias: A Unified Approach for Understanding
Problems with Risk Assessment, 46 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV., 185, 190–93 (2019) (detailing
ProPublica and Northpointe’s positions on the COMPAS tool); Emily Berman, A Government of
Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. Rev. 1277, 1328 (2018) (same); Eaglin, supra note 193, at
96–97 (same); Anne L. Washington, How to Argue with an Algorithm: Lessons from the COMPASProPublica Debate, 17 COLO. TECH. L.J. 131, 148-151 (2018) (same).
253. For an interactive exercise that demonstrates the challenges presented by the fairness
tradeoffs at the heart of this debate, see Karen Hao & Jonathan Stray, Can You Make AI Fairer Than
a Judge? Play Our Courtroom Algorithm Game, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 17, 2019),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/613508/ai-fairer-than-judge-criminal-risk-assessmentalgorithm/. Research has revealed that it is mathematically impossible to simultaneously meet both
definitions of fairness in the ProPublica and Northpointe debate when the input data that captures
the behavior of different groups differs. See Alexandra Chouldechova, Fair Prediction with
Disparate Impact: A Study of Bias in Recidivism Prediction Instruments, 5 BIG DATA 153 (2017)
(“[A]n instrument that satisfies predictive parity cannot have equal false positive and negative rates
across groups when the recidivism prevalence differs across those groups.”); Jon Kleinberg et al.,
Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores, 2017 PROC. INNOVATIONS
THEORETICAL COMP. SCI. 1, 17 (2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.05807.pdf (describing the
tradeoffs of measures of fairness).
254. In this way, the ProPublica measure most clearly reflects the concern that may arise when
someone is profiled—that they suffer because of what others have done in the past.
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rearrested at the same rates as others who share that label—predictive
parity—is indicative of the tool’s accuracy.255
One measure is concerned with mislabeling individuals; the other is
concerned that all those who are labeled alike are treated alike. But both
measures still look at the behavior of unrelated groups to determine how
individuals should be treated: they “evaluate[ ] [a person’s] risk using data
about other people.”256 That is, no matter how you measure it, the very
essence of profiling.257
Profiling has consequences. Among the most disturbing is the “ratchet
effect.”258 This concept describes a type of feedback loop that produces
disparities between groups who come into contact with the criminal legal
system repeatedly over time. It is what happens when, for example, police
focus law enforcement resources on people who match the profile of those
who are incarcerated for a particular criminal activity rather than on those
who are actually engaged in that criminal activity. The ratchet effect comes
into play because those who match the profile are subject to greater law
enforcement attention and scrutiny. That attention leads to more arrests of
the profiled group—a type of self-fulfilling prophecy that encourages further
profiling and law enforcement focus on those who match the profile.
Meanwhile, those who do not match the profile, but are still engaged in
criminal activity, do not receive the same level of law enforcement attention,
if they receive any at all. Ultimately, the ratchet effect creates the false
impression that the only people who commit crimes are those who match a
profile.259 Much like the potential feedback loop forged by predictive
policing, actuarial tools at sentencing encourage us to continue incarcerating
the same populations repeatedly which, in turn, fosters the inequity that feeds
mass incarceration and criminalization.
Thus, by profiling members of the group who are most likely to be
rearrested—those deemed high risk who may be “unattached, unemployed,
or unskilled”—the system ensures that those individuals are more likely to
be jailed, exacerbating the very risk those individuals allegedly pose by
placing one more barrier—a term of incarceration—in their way.260 In light
255. In other words, “[f]airness could be defined as treating everyone the same or it could be
defined as giving everyone similar outcomes.” Washington, supra note 252, at 150. Accordingly,
“[t]he central complication is that there is no single measure of racial equality in risk assessment.
Instead, there are many possible measures and, in most circumstances, it is impossible to achieve
racial equality according to every measure at once.” Mayson, supra note 24, at 2233.
256. Eckhouse, et al., supra note 252, at 198.
257. See supra note 232
258. Harcourt, supra note 30, at 220 (emphasis omitted).
259. Id. at 3.
260. Id. at 220.
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of the foregoing, it is not hard to see that deep, troubling problems flow from
the profiling problem of actuarial risk assessments at sentencing.
II. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
To this point, I have grappled with the history, design, and
implementation of algorithmic tools at three distinct decision points in the
criminal legal system—policing, bail, and sentencing. In doing so, I have
catalogued the types of problems that accompany the use of those tools. They
rest on data infected by racial bias, and therefore produce forecasts that reflect
that bias. They are aimed at the people already targeted by the criminal legal
system rather than the system or its decisionmakers. And they encourage
profiling by recommending a criminal legal system response based on a
person’s association with a group.
Solutions to these problems do not come easy.
The most
straightforward would be ending the use of algorithmic tools in the criminal
legal system altogether. At first glance, that is a simple fix. However, given
the widespread nature of algorithmic tools,261 it is unlikely to happen any time
in the near future. Even if abolition of the tools merits consideration as an
ultimate goal, that road will be paved with paradigmatic shifts in the way
systems operate. The rapid development and expansion of algorithmic tools
can be viewed as providing opportunities to shape those shifts of the system
and implement potential solutions. A blunt end to the use of algorithmic tools
also fails to account for the nuance and complexity of the problems they
present. All tools—and all stages of the system—are not equal. Nor do they
distribute their harms evenly. In keeping with that view, what follows is an
exploration of the ways that we might mitigate the potential and realized
harms that flow from the use of algorithmic tools in the criminal legal system,
with an eye toward abolitionist, transformative ends.
A. A Framework for Confronting Algorithmic Tools
A framework to confront the challenges raised by algorithmic tools
requires that we interrogate the role of race, its relationship to power, and the
influence of both phenomena on the law.262 If we understand algorithmic
261. Henry, supra note 152 (“Nearly every U.S. state and the federal system have implemented
risk assessment in some form.”); Huq, supra note 11, at 1052 (noting that algorithmic tools are
“likely to soon become pervasive” in the criminal legal system).
262. KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW ET AL., PART FIVE: THE SEARCH FOR AN OPPOSITIONAL
VOICE, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii
(Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (noting that goal of critical race theory is “not merely to
understand the vexed bond between law and racial power but to change it”); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices
of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100
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tools as instruments that carry the potential to reproduce the racial inequity
of our criminal legal system, a lens that is rooted in critical race theory and
which focuses on and scrutinizes the nature of racial inequality seems not
only appropriate but required.263 A focus on the role of race in shaping the
law—and by extension the world that the law inhabits, defines, and
regulates—holds the most promise for a fundamental shift in the way
algorithmic tools and the American criminal legal system operate.264
The next Section applies a racial justice lens to the challenges presented
by algorithmic tools. It addresses what these tools would look like and how
they would be deployed if we accepted that racism is a permanent fixture;
that the exercise of classification parallels the construction of race; that bold
changes are needed to combat the reform/retrenchment paradigm and the
tendency of the law to favor the status quo; that the voices of the marginalized
are the voices that matter; and that we should engage with the nuance and
complexity that shapes one’s identity. What follows is a discussion about the
policy choices that we need to make regarding the balance of power and
algorithmic tools in a way that confronts the racism and unfairness that
pervades the criminal legal system.265

YALE L.J. 1329, 1331 n.7 (1991) (explaining that critical race theory works “to develop a
jurisprudence that accounts for the role of racism in American law and that works toward the
elimination of racism as part of a larger goal of eliminating all forms of subordination”)
263. A racial justice lens challenges the dominant bases for American antidiscrimination law—
the notion that colorblindness produces race neutrality and that color consciousness produces racial
preferences. Devon W. Carbado, Critical What What?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1593, 1609 (2011). It
does so by demonstrating how “‘colorblind’ laws often serve to further insider privileges along the
lines of race, gender, and class, while marginalizing and obscuring social, political, and economic
inequality.” I. Bennett Capers, Afrofuturism, Critical Race Theory, and Policing in the Year 2044,
94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2019). In this way, a racial justice lens “embraces color
consciousness . . . as the way to rectify today’s racist legal legacies.” Adrien Katherine Wing, Space
Traders for the Twenty-First Century, 11 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 49, 51 (2009). These
contributions speak to racism’s position not as the product of individual biases alone, but as a
structural and institutional phenomenon. Carbado, supra note 263, at 1612.
264. DOROTHY A. BROWN, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 1
(2014) (“Critical Race Theory askes the question: ‘what does race have to do with it?’”). Critical
race theory has also been described as a discipline that:
[E]xhumes the atrocities of our historical past and confronts their continuing curse; it
articulates the ways in which race, gender, and class inequality converge and
interpenetrate; and it focuses our attention on the problems of structural discrimination,
unequal treatment, and the incomplete nature of democracy in our social order.
Michael Omi & Howard Winant, The Unfinished Business of Race, in RACE LAW STORIES ix
(Rachel F. Moran and Devon W. Carbado eds. 2008). For an overview of critical race theory, see
Osagie K. Obasogie, Foreword: Critical Race Theory and Empirical Methods, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV.
183, 184 (2013); Capers, supra note 264, at 20–30; Adrien K. Wing, Is There a Future for Critical
Race Theory?, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 44, 47–53 (2016).
265. Although the focus of this article is on the criminal legal system, the problems of
algorithmic tools, and racial justice, the solutions I have suggested could apply with equal force in
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B. Accepting the Truth: The Permanence of Racism
Racism is a permanent, fixed feature of American society.266 It is
“constitutive of, rather than oppositional to, American democracy,”267 and
woven into our nation’s fabric.268 It is “an integral, permanent, and
indestructible component of this society.”269 This conclusion stems not from
a sense of hopelessness or an acceptance of the second-class citizenship and
inequity that racism breeds. It instead emanates from a deep, reflective, and
clear-eyed examination of America’s history and current condition.
Countless scholars have documented, with excruciating detail, the
defect that marred America’s birth and continues to shape its life: the
ideology of white supremacy, which defined superiority and inferiority along
racial lines.270 Indeed, this racist ideology was America’s birthright, baked
into the country’s DNA.271 It has been with us for at least four centuries.272
In that time, it has served a number of purposes. It was used to prop up and
justify the enslavement of African people in America.273 It delineated
freedom. It was the handmaiden to the criminal legal system. And it is so
interwoven within the range of institutions that govern American life that its
presence is ubiquitous today.274 The deep-rooted nature of institutional,
structural, and interpersonal racism, when weighed against the current pace
of racial justice-oriented reform, leaves little room for us to hope that we can
disentangle racism from the American way of life.
The endemic nature of racism bears the weight of a fundamental truth
worthy of acceptance. Yet doing so—actually accepting the deep-seated
nature of racism—presents challenges for those who seek to deploy

other domains as well where algorithmic tools are used to sort, identify, and produce forecasts about
people or places and where those tools rely on existing data to do so.
266. Carbado, supra note 263, at 1613.
267. Id. at 1613; Wing, supra note 264, at 48
268. ANTHONY C. THOMPSON ET AL., A PERILOUS PATH: TALKING RACE, INEQUALITY, AND
THE LAW 2 (EDS. 2018).
269. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM, ix
(1992).
270. See generally, Nikole Hannah-Jones, Our Democracy’s Founding Ideals Were False When
They Were Written. Black American Have Fought to Make Them True., N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug.
14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/black-history-americandemocracy.html; THOMPSON ET. AL., supra note 268, at 88; IBRAM X. KENDI, STAMPED FROM THE
BEGINNING: THE DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF RACIST IDEAS IN AMERICA (2016).
271. Hannah-Jones, supra note 270.
272. Id.
273. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 28–31.
274. Id. at 26–30; Bryan Stevenson, Why American Prisons Owe Their Cruelty to Slavery, N.Y
TIMES MAG. (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/prisonindustrial-complex-slavery-racism.html.
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algorithmic tools as a means to attack decision-making infected by implicit
and explicit racism. One of the more difficult challenges of accepting the
omnipresence of racism is the natural disappointment that comes with
realizing that there is no way to eradicate it. Yet that realization obscures
what should be the target of our efforts when we seek to employ algorithmic
tools in the criminal legal system. Rather than attempting to solve racism,
acceptance that racism is a permanent, fixed feature forces us to confront and
take stock of the role that racism plays as we design, implement, and engage
in oversight of algorithmic tools. That is true not only in the data upon which
the tools rely but in the targets at which those tools are leveled, the outputs
that those tools produce, and the very institution in which the tools are
deployed. The policy recommendations in this Section are informed by, and
flow from, recognition and acceptance of this basic premise, with good
reason. Our times demand it, and our reality dictates it. Not only because
the ideology of racial supremacy and inferiority has shaped American society
and its governing institutions, but because the data tells us that the same
ideology casts an inescapable shadow over policy and practice in the criminal
legal system today.275
We cannot hope to change the current state of affairs if we proceed as
though the status quo is divorced from our history and our reality. An
intentional and focused orientation toward that history and a fulsome
response to what it has produced is necessary. This is not a radical idea. It
is a suggestion that we exchange those values that blind us to our past for
those which acknowledge that history and work to address it—something
akin to what we might call a form of digital reparations.276

275. Balko, supra note 3.
276. The contrast between the values that blind us to our history and those that require we
acknowledge it was most readily illustrated in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,
Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 572
U.S. 291 (2014). The majority in Schuette upheld an amendment to Michigan’s constitution that
barred race conscious admissions policies in higher education. Id. at 315. Justice Sotomayor, in
dissent, explained, “My colleagues are of the view that we should leave race out of the picture
entirely and let the voters sort it out. . . . We have seen this reasoning before.” Id. at 380
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). See Parents Involved in Comm. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating
on the basis of race.”). It is, unfortunately, a sentiment out of touch with reality, one not required
by our Constitution, and one that has properly been rejected as ‘not sufficient’ to resolve cases of
this nature. Schuette, 572 U.S. at 380 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor further
remarked:
This refusal to accept the stark reality that race matters is regrettable. The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race,
and to apply the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of
racial discrimination. . . . [W]e ought not sit back and wish away, rather than confront,
the racial inequality that exists in our society. It is this view that works harm, by
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C. The Implications of Acceptance
Several policy prescriptions emerge when we take seriously the
implications of the worldview that racial inequality is not a passing
phenomenon but instead a permanent feature. They fall into three categories.
First, there are those that relate to the input data fed into the algorithmic tools
and adjustments to the forecasts that the tools produce. That means
accounting for race in the data on which algorithmic tools rely (the inputs)
and in the forecasts (the outputs) that they produce.
Second, there are those that center on the actors who design and use
algorithmic tools. In this case, that means requiring actors that seek to use
algorithmic tools to detect and remedy the real and potential harms of those
tools. It also means placing algorithmic tools in the hands of communities so
that they may deploy them to scrutinize system actors.
Finally, there are broader policy prescriptions about the criminal legal
system as a whole that can inform when and whether these instruments are
useful. This intervention requires countering the turn to raw numbers with
attention to the stories of those enmeshed in the criminal legal system,
privileging qualitative information over quantitative data.
Ultimately these interventions would serve as a paradigmatic shift in the
way the current system operates, opening up the potential for a different
criminal legal system. I address each policy prescription in turn, beginning
with changes to input data and the forecasts produced by the tools.
1. Accounting for Race in the Inputs
This first category of measures responsive to the permanence of racism
requires that we develop tools that credibly account for racism and the
disparities it produces, in the same way factors like prior criminal history,
employment status, and education are part of the data analyzed by an
algorithmic tool. Fully acknowledging the feature-level nature of race in this
way means orienting our work to meet the challenge posed by quantifying
the role of race and adjust policy accordingly. To some, that may sound like
a radical intervention. In reality, it is what justice, in light of history, requires.
Those who accept the reality of racism and develop algorithmic tools
could be explicit about the racial dimensions of the inputs. Rather than
engaging in the Sisyphean task of attempting to scrub the data of racism, tool
designers could attempt to measure the ways racism shapes the data and then
account for it in the algorithms they build and the instruments they create.
perpetuating the facile notion that what makes race matter is acknowledging the simple
truth that race does matter.
Id. at 381.
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The criminal legal system constantly generates data that could be
considered as part of such an effort. For example, if a particular precinct
engages in discriminatory policing, the disparities that result from those
discriminatory practices would be accounted for in the data set, the algorithm,
and the outputs.277 Data from that precinct could be included but discounted
by a quantifiable factor because of the racially disparate impact of policing,
or weighted by what one might expect to see in the absence of discriminatory
policing. Arrest data produced by officers could be quantitatively evaluated
and adjusted to reflect policing patterns and behaviors that are otherwise
problematic.278 Predictions that flow from tools that rely on such data might
be accompanied by an explicit disclaimer that the data relied upon is tainted
by a history of racially discriminatory policing practices.279
Racial disparities in areas such as housing, education, health, wealth,
employment, and criminal legal system contact are not unknowable or
unknown; they are simply ignored or elided. And yet they are fully baked
into the outputs of tools which rely on such data points. If we know that to
be the case, it is incumbent on us to take stock of that fact. Quantifying how
these disparities shape the lives and the experiences of communities, and then
discounting the data points by that numerical value is another way of
surfacing and accounting for race.280 One might attempt to quantify a world
that we seek, where all races were treated equally by the criminal legal
system, and choose to use that data as part of the analysis.281
Leveling the algorithmic playing field is undoubtedly a complex and
challenging undertaking.282 Racial inequality can shape institutions and
individual lives in ways that can be impossible to quantify. Since race is a
construct, and the dimensions of racism transform over time as the political,
legal, and social context change, it may not be possible to design a specific
277. Richardson et al., supra note 71, at 24–26.
278. Id. at 17–20
279. Id.
280. Such an accounting is reminiscent of a racial attrition index, which Professor Derrick Bell
imagined would be “prepared by social scientists and computer-oriented statisticians [to] provide a
dramatic rendering of our social progress and decline.” CARVING OUT A HUMANITY 155 (Janet
Dewart Bell & Vincent M. Southerland eds., 2020).
281. Some researchers have attempted to account for racial inequality—and the benefit that
white people receive because of their race—by proposing that an algorithmic tool be trained on
white people alone as the more privileged group. Richard Berk & Ayya A. Elzarka, Almost
Politically Acceptable Criminal Justice Risk Assessment, 1, 10 (Dec. 31, 2019),
https://www.cis.upenn.edu/~mkearns/teaching/ScienceDataEthics/AlmostPC.pdf. Such a solution
is by no means adequate, or even necessarily advisable, but serves as an example of the type of work
that could be undertaken to address the racial inequality embedded in data.
282. See Mayson, supra note 24, at 2265–67 (examining the potential in allowing an “algorithm
to assess . . . risk factors contingent on race” and describing the possible trade-off in predictive
ability of the tool).
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measure to capture its effects.283 It may be that we can never account for all
the ways bias, inequity, and racism shape people’s lives.284 But that
challenge cannot be dispositive.
The criminal legal system often deals in nuance: the appropriate
quantum of punishment, the justifications necessary to vindicate law
enforcement intrusion, the decision to proceed to trial or plead guilty, and the
credibility of a witness at trial as weighed against biases—explicit and
implicit—that shape their testimony. Rather than turn away from the
complexity, by design the legal system regularly imposes a requirement that
decisionmakers confront and consider it, even if that consideration is less
than ideal. A ready example is the instruction given to jurors when evaluating
the credibility of a witness against the biases that may shape the witness’s
testimony.285 While racism may be a permanent force, its permanence does
not prevent us from taking stock of its effects, shaping and remaking the tools
that guide decisions with close to full knowledge regarding its effects.
2. Accounting for Race in the Outputs
The challenges of quantifying the impact of racial inequality with
precision also do not prevent us from having a different set of responses to
the data, or the tools that analyze it. If our aim ultimately is to eliminate
283. Carbado, supra note 263, at 1611. Race has no biological significance; it only contains the
meaning that we give it. Id. at 24. “The anthropologist Ashley Montagu was among the first to
argue that race is a human invention, a social construct, not a biological one . . . .” ISABEL
WILKERSON, CASTE: THE ORIGINS OF OUR DISCONTENTS 24 (2020). The law differentiates
between races and determines the racial categories into which we sort individuals and assigns
meanings to those categories—both good and bad—in service of a hierarchy that serves the interests
of those in power—the status quo. Id.
284. To be clear, there is no singular experience or set of unifying characteristics tied to identity.
Capers, supra note 263, at 25–26; Devon Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Intersectionality at 30:
Mapping the Margins of Anti-Essentialism, Intersectionality, and Dominance Theory, 132 HARV.
L. REV. 2193, 2205 (2019). Although the focus here is on race, an ideal approach is one that
accounts for multiple, complex grounds of identity that drive oppression, marginalization, and
treatment. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 166-67 (1989).
285. For example, New York jurors are instructed as follows:
As judges of the facts, you alone determine the truthfulness and accuracy of the testimony
of each witness. You must decide whether a witness told the truth and was accurate, or
instead, testified falsely or was mistaken. You must also decide what importance to give
to the testimony you accept as truthful and accurate.”
N.Y STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, Credibility of a Witness, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS:
INSTRUCTIONS OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY 1, 2 (2018), https://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/1General/CJI2d.Credibility.pdf. While the instructions go on to state that “[t]here is no particular
formula for evaluating the truthfulness and accuracy of another person’s statements or testimony[,]”
jurors are told to consider, among other things, whether the witness harbored “a bias, hostility or
some other attitude that affected the truthfulness of the witness’s testimony.” Id.
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unwarranted, race-driven disparate treatment in the administration of
criminal law, we can readily implement policy responses that help us to
achieve that goal. What I am suggesting is a complete repurposing of
algorithmic tools for ends that boldly attack the manifestations of racial
inequality at a structural and institutional level. In this way, the tools could
function like a “mirror;” our response is an adjustment of what is reflected
back to us.286
That may mean responding to the targets of predictive policing with
investments of resources, rather than the deployment of law enforcement, in
the places where those tools forecast crime will take place. It could require
that the people we view as potential victims or perpetrators of crimes are
treated through a public health lens, rather than a criminal legal system lens,
such that we provide those people with an array of services, supports, and
investments to ensure that forecasts about them do not come to pass. We
may choose to send social workers, doctors, and mental health professionals
to respond to forecasts of potential future criminal activity rather than
police.287 Or we may decide to make a different set of investments in those
communities expressly focused on supporting institutions that help steer
people away from the criminal legal system, such as education, employment,
housing, and health.288
In the arena of pretrial decision-making, it could be that we calibrate
decisions to suggest release for the overwhelming majority of those charged
with crimes such that no disparity exists, even if the accuracy of forecasts
produced by the tool suffers.289 We could weigh the outputs used to guide
sentencing decisions with data that reflects the nature of racial disparities in

286. See Mayson, supra note 24, at 2251 (describing the enterprise of prediction through
algorithmic tools as a mirror).
287. See, e.g., Christie Thompson, This City Stopped Sending Police to Every 911 Call, THE
MARSHALL
PROJECT
(July
24,
2020),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2020/07/24/crisisresponders; Rowan Moore Gerety, An Alternative to Police that Police Can Get
Behind,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Dec.
28,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2020/12/cahoots-program-may-reduce-likelihood-of-police-violence/617477/;
Andy
Corbley, Instead of Responding with Cops, Denver Sends Health Care Teams to Non-Criminal Calls
– And it’s Already Saving Lives, GOOD NEWS NETWORK (Feb. 15, 2021),
https://www.goodnewsnetwork.org/denver-looks-at-nonviolent-mental-health-policing-with-theirstar-social-worker-unit/.
288. See, e.g., Jacyln Cosgrove, L.A. County Voters Approve Measure J, Providing New Funding
for Social Services, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-1103/2020-la-election-tracking-measure-j (60% of Los Angeles voters voted in favor of Measure J,
which “requires that 10% of locally generated, unrestricted county money—estimated between $360
million and $900 million—be spent on a variety of social services, including housing, mental health
treatment and investments in communities disproportionally harmed by racism”).
289. See Yang, supra note 124 (explaining that English common law presumed release for those
accused of noncapital crimes).
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sentencing for particular crimes, communities, and individuals, along with
data that accounts for the challenges that individuals face when attempting to
reintegrate into society by finding stable employment, housing, healthcare,
and other services.
While it could invite a constitutional challenge,290 we may choose to be
race conscious in our responses to the data and tools as we seek to eliminate
the racial disparities in the forecasts they produce. Imagine our response to
tools that tell us people of color need to be policed more heavily, are more
likely to fail to appear in court, or are more likely to recidivate than their
white counterparts. We could decide to reduce or eliminate police presence
in communities of color, set lower thresholds for pretrial release (or higher
bars for pretrial detention), or act in less punitive ways toward all people at
sentencing to advance equity. In this way, our response to what the data and
the tools are telling us would differ dramatically. System actors employing
a race conscious lens could forgo our typical, harsh and punitive responses—
too often fueled by race-based inequity in service of a status quo that has
always been unfavorable to people of color.
D. Additional Paths Forward
The next Section grapples with three potential policy prescriptions to
address the problems presented by algorithmic tools using a racial justice
lens. First, such a lens suggests putting the onus on algorithmic tool vendors
and system actors to root out and remedy discriminatory impacts imposed by
algorithmic tools. Second, it means placing algorithmic tools in the hands of
communities to hold accountable those actors who engage in discriminatory
or otherwise harmful conduct. Finally, it requires rejecting the type of
profiling that actuarial tools encourage. In its place, a racial justice lens
suggests adopting an individualized notion of justice that truly accounts for
the complexity and story of the person standing before the court, rather than
the characteristics that person shared with others.
These solutions seek to shift power to those who are currently powerless
given their relationship to the criminal system, while imposing the burdens
of antiracism where they belong: on institutional actors and tool vendors.
They also raise questions that suggest a broader vision of justice. The hope
is that such a dynamic may encourage the type of wholesale transformation
the criminal legal system desperately needs, driven by abolition.

290. See infra notes 397–399 and accompanying text.
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1. Shift the Burden
One of the more promising features of algorithmic tools is their ability
to surface shortcomings in the law that require a shift in our current legal
regime. One such shortcoming is the challenge the law presents in remedying
the racially discriminatory harms that individuals may suffer when
algorithmic tools are at play. Generally, the onus is on the victim of racial
discrimination to use the law in order to identify and remedy their own
harm.291 Unfortunately, the law is not always up to the task. Indeed, the
law’s failure actually perpetuates the status quo, necessitating a radical
intervention to produce progressive change.292 Placing the burden to root out
and remedy algorithmic racial discrimination on tool vendors and the
institutions that seek to use them, rather than on those who are assessed by
the tools, may be one way to address the law’s failure. A review of the
constitutional barriers to accountability faced by potential victims of
algorithmic discrimination underscores the value of this potential solution.
The Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause is the most significant
avenue available to challenge the racial discrimination in the administration
of criminal justice by state actors.293 Yet the limits placed on the Equal
Protection Clause to redress systemic discrimination in the criminal system
have stifled reform and perpetuated inequity for over three decades, since the
Supreme Court’s decision in McCleskey v. Kemp.294 McCleskey applied the
purposeful discrimination standard first articulated in Washington v. Davis295
and affirmed in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing

291. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (requiring that a
complainant charging racial employment discrimination under Title VII prove a prima facie case of
racial discrimination. Under this regime, a plaintiff must prove that her race was a “but-for” cause
of her adverse treatment).
292. See Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 85 (2006) (finding that in racial harassment claims, Black and Asian American
plaintiffs have the lowest percentage of wins – at 19.3% and 18.9%, respectively – compared to
white plaintiffs, who have a 35% success rate).
293. The focus of this section is on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause as a
means to address discriminatory harms because it is the principal means to do so in the criminal
legal system absent state antidiscrimination law. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)
(“[T]he constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the
Equal Protection Clause. . . .”). Litigants have also unsuccessfully pursued challenges made
pursuant to the due process clause. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied sub
nom., Loomis v. Wisconsin, 137 S.Ct. 2290 (2017).
294. 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Annika Neklason, The ‘Death Penalty’s Dred Scott’ Lives On,
ATLANTIC (June 14, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/06/legacymccleskey-v-kemp/591424/.
295. 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
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Development Corporation.296 In doing so, the Court ruled that a successful
Equal Protection challenge must demonstrate that government officials
exercised their discretion with a “discriminatory purpose,” amounting to
intentional, purposeful discrimination.297 In the absence of such a
determination, an Equal Protection claim must fail.298 The Court explained
that it “would demand exceptionally clear proof before [it] would infer that
the discretion has been abused.”299 While the dissent decried the majority’s
decision as the manifestation of “a fear of too much justice,” the intentional
discrimination standard has remained the law since 1987.300
Equal Protection doctrine is “woeful[ly] inadequa[te]” to address the
“forms and dynamics of algorithmic criminal justice tools.” 301 First, as a
technical matter, it is incredibly difficult to surface intentional discrimination
in the context of the tools themselves.302 “There is no such thing as code that
bespeaks racial animus.”303 Evidence of discriminatory intent, difficult to
amass when algorithmic tools are not at play, is even more difficult to
uncover when trying to assess why particular features of data were selected
to train an algorithm.304 This concern is just one of a number raised by the
search of purposeful discrimination in algorithmic tools.305
Practical problems of proof also assume that there is explicit malicious
intent to be found. It may not be, given that those who design tools and
implement them do so with the express intention of addressing the bias that
296. 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977). While an expansive discussion of the development of Equal
Protection jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this article, a brief review is useful. The Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence shifted in the late 1970s, from examining allegations of purposeful
discrimination in context to searching for malice. The Court turned away from a concern with
purposeful discrimination through the lens of “contextual intent,” which “focused on motives [of
alleged discriminatory actors] only in the loosest sense (and sometimes not at all).” Ian HaneyLópez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1785 (2012). Abandoning context, in
subsequent years, the Court turned to a search for “malicious intent” which “declares direct proof
of injurious motives a prerequisite and, more pertinently, renders contextual evidence irrelevant.”
Id.
297. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 298.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 297.
300. Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
301. Huq, supra note 11, at 1083.
302. Id. at 1102.
303. Id. at 1066.
304. Id. at 1098.
305. Others include sorting out and assigning malice to the motives for the design and
implementation of an algorithmic tool, looking at the challenges posed by examining the wide range
of actors in the system that contribute to the data that informs the tools and “aggregating a large
number of dispersed individual motives so as to ascertain whether a but-for standard of
intentionality has been met by a collectivity,” and considering whether reliance on flawed data
would amount to intentional discrimination. Id. at 1088–94.
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so often pervades the criminal legal system, even when those tools encourage
decisions that may reflect the biased data that they are fed.306 Unlike the
police officer who explicitly engages in racial profiling, or the prosecutor
who exercises discriminatory peremptory challenges, or the judge who, with
purposeful animus, levies harsh punishments on people of color, the motives
of those in the algorithmic tool business are publicly stated as racially
benevolent.307 That benevolence, in the context of a legal framework
designed to respond to explicit and malicious acts of racial discrimination, is
a shield from the interrogation that proof of an Equal Protection violation
requires.308
In many ways, the concern that the searching scrutiny of our Equal
Protection framework fails to account for the way actuarial tools operate
parallels concerns first raised by Professor Charles Lawrence in his seminal
work highlighting the gap between “unconscious bias” and the purposeful
discrimination standard imposed by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause.309 The advent of algorithmic tools and the
regulation that accompanies their use provides a new opportunity to upset old
standards that have proven unresponsive to the realities of discrimination.310

306. See Risk Assessments, When Paired with Appropriate Policies, Can Contribute
Significantly
to
Pretrial
Reform,
ARNOLD
VENTURES
(July
1,
2019),
https://www.arnoldventures.org/newsroom/risk-assessments-when-paired-with-appropriatepolicies-can-contribute-significantly-to-pretrial-reform/ (“We are strongly committed to reducing
racial bias in pretrial decision making. In particular, we seek to understand how risk assessment
can be used to reduce racially disparate outcomes.”).
307. Id.; see also Ferguson, supra note 115 (describing a predictive policing company’s efforts
to account for racial bias in policing).
308. Huq, supra note 11, at 1088 (“The concerns of constitutional law simply do not map onto
the ways in which race impinges on algorithmic criminal justice. The result is a gap between legal
criteria and their objects. Crucially, the two main doctrinal touchstones of bad intent and bad
classifications provide scant traction for the analysis of algorithmic criminal justice. Both hinge on
concepts that translate poorly, if at all, to the algorithmic context and are not easily adapted for
application to that end. A focus on racial animus will almost never be fruitful. A focus on
classification leads to perverse and unjustified results. The replacement of unstructured discretion
with algorithmic precision, therefore, thoroughly destabilizes how equal protection doctrine works
on the ground. The resulting mismatches compel my conclusion that a new framework is needed
for thinking about the pertinent racial equity questions.”).
309. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 318–26 (1987).
310. Even efforts to hold accountable those who use actuarial tools with a knowledge of their
disparate impact are foreclosed by the law, because “‘[d]iscriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more
than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.
It implies that the
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’
not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (quoting Personnel Adm’r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979)) .
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Given this opportunity to change the standard, policymakers must act.
They must craft new regulatory schemes that can vindicate the potential
harms imposed by algorithmic tools and fill the gaps of the Equal Protection
Clause. At a minimum, such legislation should impose an ex ante check on
algorithmic tools to alleviate harmful disparate impacts and to ensure that
there is continued monitoring of the potentially harmful burdens imposed by
use of the tools.311 Such a framework has the potential to alleviate the
challenges of proof that litigants face in demonstrating that the harmful
effects of a tool go beyond an individual to others who are similarly situated.
A cursory survey of legislative activity and advocacy efforts attempting
to curb the discriminatory harms imposed by actuarial justice provides some
encouragement. New York has enacted a requirement that pretrial risk
assessments be “designed and implemented in a way that ensures the results
are free from discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, sex, or any
other protected class.”312 Notably, while this provision has not yet been
applied or interpreted by any New York courts, it contains no explicit intent
requirement. It also imposes an affirmative obligation on the state to ensure
that the tools they use are free from discrimination.313 Similar legislation was
under consideration in Washington and enacted into law in Idaho.314 At the
federal level, three members of Congress introduced the Algorithmic
Accountability Act of 2019, which would essentially require technology
vendors to test the algorithms they use for bias.315 Once again, this legislation

311. Scholars have offered ways to measure the impact of algorithmic tools on racial equity.
Huq, supra note 11, at 1128 (“[A]n appropriate benchmark would home in upon the net cost (or
benefit) of an algorithmic criminal justice instrument for the racial minority in the socially
subordinate position.”). My concern is not so much with the metric of fairness being used, though
that is deeply important, but requiring those who seek to design and implement the tools to
demonstrate that they do not exacerbate racial inequality. Choice of a fairness metric is a policy
determination, rather than a technical one, that would need to be made in the policymaking process.
See Mayson, supra note 24 at 2238–47 (detailing a host of applicable equality metrics); see id. at
2294–95 (describing a combination of equality metrics that tools might meet); see also THE
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS, THE USE OF PRETRIAL “RISK
ASSESSMENT” INSTRUMENTS: A SHARED STATEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS CONCERNS (2018),
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/criminal-justice/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-Full.pdf (recommending
the use of varied measures of racial equity).
312. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.45(3)(b)(i) (McKinney 2020).
313. Id. § 510.45(3)(b)(i).
314. DJ Pangburn, Washington Could Be the First State to Rein in Automated Decision-Making,
FAST CO. (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90302465/washington-introduceslandmark-algorithmic-accountability-laws; Beryl Lipton, Idaho Legislators Approve Law
Requiring Transparency for Risk Assessment Tools, MUCKROCK (Mar. 26, 2019),
https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2019/mar/26/algorithms-idaho-bill-update/.
315. Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. (2019). There are, in
fact, efforts underway to audit algorithmic tools in a range of domains, though the parameters of the
audit, the undefined nature of the field, the ways in which private companies choose to deploy the
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imposes an affirmative obligation on those who seek to design and implement
tools.
Policy advocates have also advanced frameworks to shift the burden of
rooting out harm from individuals to stakeholders. Algorithmic Impact
Assessments (“AIA”) are one such example of this burden shifting
framework. Modeled on environmental impact assessments, AIAs work by
requiring government agencies to “assess how . . . systems are used, whether
they are producing disparate impacts, and how to hold them accountable.”316
They require government agencies to conduct a self-assessment of existing
and proposed algorithmic tools to evaluate their potential impacts, engage
external researchers to conduct ongoing auditing, publicly disclose audit
results prior to procurement of an algorithmic tool, solicit public comments
regarding the tool, and provide mechanisms for communities or individuals
to challenge systems that produce harms.317 The framework is meant to
enhance public accountability of algorithmic tools, “[i]ncrease public
agencies’ internal expertise and capacity to evaluate the systems they build
or procure” for disparate impacts, and empower the public with knowledge
about tools in use and opportunities to determine the contours of
accountability.318
Assessments of impact prior to adoption and implementation are already
required in some jurisdictions with regard to criminal justice policy. Racial
impact statements, for example, allow lawmakers to evaluate the racial
disparities that legislation may produce before it is adopted and
implemented.319 In 2008, Iowa became the first state to adopt such a measure,

audit, and the relatively small number of firms that offer auditing capabilities provide some sense
of the challenges posed by those efforts. Alfred Ng, Can Auditing Eliminate Bias from Algorithms?,
MARKUP (Feb. 23, 2021), https://themarkup.org/ask-the-markup/2021/02/23/can-auditingeliminate-bias-from-algorithms.
316. Dillon Reisman et. al., Algorithmic Impact Assessments: A Practical Framework for Public
Agency Accountability, AINOW 1, 4 (2018), https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 5.
319. Nicole D. Porter, Racial Impact Statements, SENT’G PROJECT (Sept. 30, 2019),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/racial-impact-statements/.
In the algorithmic
context these efforts could take on the character of race audits, described by Professor Robin
Lenhardt as evaluative mechanisms that can be used “by localities interested in grappling with the
inequalities that attend the color line.” R.A. Lenhardt, Race Audits, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1527, 1534
(2011). Such audits do not search for “the proverbial wrongdoer,” but instead surface how racial
inequality reveals itself in systems, procedures, practices, and relationships of a municipality across
multiple life domains. Id. Subjecting algorithmic tools to a similar audit, sensitive to racial
inequality, would theoretically expose how an algorithmic tool might perpetuate inequality. See
also, Deborah N. Archer, “White Men’s Roads Through Black Men’s Homes”: Advancing Racial
Equity Through Highway Reconstruction, 73 Van. L. Rev. 1259, 1321 (2020) (recommending the
use of racial equity impact studies by “policymakers embarking on highway development and
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with four other states doing so since then.320 The Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines Commission produces racial impact statements, though is not
required to do so by law.321 New Jersey became the latest state to do so in
2018, passing a law that “requires the state’s Office of Legislative Services
to prepare racial-impact statements for policy changes that affect pretrial
detention, sentencing and parole.”322 Such measures allow jurisdictions to
uncover the causes of racial disparities and to understand how policy changes
can exacerbate or reduce them.323
Other accountability and oversight measures may rely more heavily on
vendors and private industry. Ethical codes of conduct that impose moral
commitments on those who produce technology are another means of
oversight, though they may place too much reliance on the malleable moral
compass of corporate actors, rendering such measures unreliable.324
Requiring an algorithm’s proponent to provide a human impact statement,
which could outline the expected ramifications of an algorithmic tool on a
population, is one other accountability mechanism.325
In practice, such measures might require algorithmic tool designers to
disclose the datasets they relied upon to develop their tools, the efforts they
undertook to assess those datasets for biases, and the measures taken to
ensure that the forecasts produced by the tools do not unjustifiably vary by
race.326 Such requirements are perfectly reasonable and well understood in

redevelopment projects should engage in a systematic, comprehensive, and holistic review of how
racial and ethnic groups will be impacted by the project”)
320. Porter, supra note 319.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Barkow, supra note 10, at 1610–13.
324. Sonia Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV.
54, 108 (2019) (“The issue of algorithmic accountability demonstrates one core aspect that is
missing among computer scientists and software engineers: a concrete, user-friendly, ethical
platform with which to approach decisionmaking and software design.”).
325. See id. at 115–18 (describing the proposed elements of a human impact statement); see also
Erin Murphy, The Mismatch Between Twenty-First-Century Forensic Evidence and Our Antiquated
Criminal Justice System, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 633, 658–61 (2014) (recommending a “collective
confrontation right to transparency and accountability standards in forensic analysis” that would
place the onus on proponents of forensic evidence to offer evidence of structural and systemic
features and quality control measures that ensure the accuracy of such evidence).
326. This work would require grappling with, and potentially using, different measures of
fairness to evaluate unwarranted disparities produced by an algorithmic tool. See supra notes 244–
256 and accompanying text for a discussion of two measures of fairness. It would also require
vendors to examine the data used, the algorithm, and the outputs for racial disparities. One can
imagine a range of efforts that vendors may have to undertake to account for unwarranted racial
disparities, including consulting additional data sources, disregarding data sources, weighting
forecasts produced by their tools, or providing an explicit disclaimer about the reliability of the
output forecast because racial inequality is baked into the data relied upon. Forcing proponents of
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administrative law.327 Fundamentally, these frameworks force those who
seek to develop and wield algorithmic tools to ask the difficult questions
about the racialized harms they may produce upfront and actually address
those harms when they surface. They must also accommodate the critiques
leveled at tools by impacted communities. In their absence, those at the
greatest risk of suffering a racially disparate impact are left to the inadequate
tools provided by the law, ensuring that bias will persist, largely unchecked.
2. Flip the Gaze
Acknowledgment of racism’s permanence helps to shape the contours
of another response to the concerns driven by actuarial and algorithmic
decision-making: turning the tools away from the individuals subjected to the
system and toward the institutional actors who run it. The idea behind this
recommendation is simple, and in part stems from the notion that
interrogating the role of race and racism in inequality is essential. If
institutional actors and reform advocates really want to address unwarranted
disparities in the administration of justice, we must be willing to subject those
whose decisions shape the system to the same data-driven, evidence-based
scrutiny that we foist on the people being shuffled through it. What is good
for the goose is good for the gander.
This inversion of the target carries with it several potential benefits.
Institutional actors—in particular, those who are making judgments about
individuals—use algorithmic tools in the hopes that it will allow them to
properly sort and classify individuals and make better decisions about them.
Why not apply that same logic to the decisionmakers themselves?
Understanding their behavior requires that we track the decisions they make
when faced with a certain set of facts, particular pieces of information, or
specific types of people. That understanding can foster accountability
through transparency by exposing the points where emotion, unreasonable
risk aversion, or flawed judgments override facts and evidence to the
detriment of those being judged.328
algorithmic tools to explain themselves carries with it the potential benefits of improving the quality
of outcomes and “deter[ring] bias and arbitrariness.” Katherine J. Strandburg, Rulemaking and
Inscrutable Automated Decision Tools, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1851, 1868 (2019). There are a host
of decision points that could be interrogated and disclosed for these purposes. See id. at 1872–73
(describing “aspects of the development of machine-learning-based decision tools, and of the
decision rules embedded in those tools, that are . . . explainable”).
327. Strandburg, supra note 326, at 1882–84 (crafting a framework to promote transparency of
machine learning tools by interpreting and applying administrative law practices to require an
explanation of a tool and preservation of information about the source of the training data, its
selection, and the methods used to validate the tool).
328. See Sarah Brayne, PREDICT AND SURVEIL: DATA, DISCRETION, AND THE FUTURE OF
POLICING 101–06 (2020) (explaining how data can be used to reduce inequality in the criminal legal
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It might also engender some empathy on the part of those institutional
actors who reflexively assert that subjecting people who are entangled with
the criminal legal system to actuarial decision-making is the best path
forward.329 Experience can be sobering. No one really likes to be held to
account, monitored, or have their decisions called into question.330 First,
there is the general uneasiness that comes with being surveilled, tracked, and
having one’s privacy upended.331 Compounding that is the fear that one’s
hard-earned, experience-driven, professional judgment is devalued by the
introduction of algorithmic tools.332 Changing the targets might lead to more
creative thinking about the efficacy of algorithmic tools and the value of their
forecasts.
Finally, it allows us to use data to shape the discretion exercised by
system actors. Commendable behavior can be encouraged by providing
support and guidance as needed where discriminatory or otherwise harmful
decision-making has surfaced. Those supports could include changes to
policy or practice, training on bias and decision-making, or a narrowing of
the choices available to avoid poor decision-making. These remedial efforts
need not be punitive if there is broad-based commitment to cleansing the
criminal legal system of as much injustice and unfairness as possible.333
Although a simple agreement about the need for change may not be enough
to overcome the natural resistance put forward by system actors, that

system by “aggregating data on police practices [to] shed light on systematic patterns and
institutional practices previously dismissed as individual-level bias, ultimately providing an
opportunity to police the police. . . .”).
329. While one would hope decision makers subjected to algorithmic tools would empathize
with those who face such tools in the criminal legal system, there is no guarantee that they would.
See id. at 98 (detailing the cognitive dissonance of police officers who did not recognize the parallels
between their discomfort with managerial surveillance and the surveillance technologies they
imposed on others).
330. Brayne & Christin, supra note 169, at 4, 9; see Brayne, supra note 328 at 75–99 (describing
law enforcement reaction to, and resistance against, managerial surveillance).
331. Brayne & Christin, supra note 169, at 9; see also Harry Bruinius, Why Police Are Pushing
Back
on
Body
Cameras,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(Aug.
30,
2016),
https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2016/0830/Why-police-are-pushing-back-on-bodycameras.
332. Brayne & Christin, supra note 169, at 9.
333. This attitude is reflected in civil and human rights lawyer Bryan Stevenson’s reminder that
part of the challenge of addressing racial inequality is that American society is obsessed with
punishment. That obsession has led people to feel that by surfacing the ways that racial inequality
has infected the world around us, punishment must result. As Stevenson reminds us,
I’m not interested in prioritizing punishment. I want to liberate us. I want to get to the
point where we can say, “‘That was bad and that was wrong and we need to get to
someplace that’s better!”‘ I want to deal with this smog created by our history of racial
inequality, so we can all breath something healthy, feel something healthy.
THOMPSON ET. AL., supra note 268, 88.
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resistance should not upend efforts to impose transparency and
accountability.
Two conditions of flipping the gaze of algorithmic tools are essential.
First, the effort to close the racial equity gap by using algorithmic tools must
be informed by a harm reduction framework, rather than the type of
ratcheting up that results when the answer to inequity is to treat everyone
more harshly. For example, if a tool reveals that a judge imposes more
lenient sentences on white people than Black people, resolving that disparity
would require treating all people with the same type of leniency that white
people receive, rather than sentencing more white people to lengthier terms
of incarceration. Ultimately, imposing such a condition helps to avoid the
same dynamic that often taints criminal policymaking to “reward
punitiveness and punish mercy.”334
Second, the tools must be placed in the hands of communities
empowered to hold institutions and actors accountable. “Community” is
defined here as the network of individuals who are advocating for equity in
the criminal legal system and are bound together by their common concerns
about the inequities fostered by the use of algorithmic tools and the criminal
legal system. Failing to provide community control has the potential to
wholly undermine the value of flipping the gaze.335
The experience of body-worn cameras as accountability mechanisms for
police conduct provides a ready example of what happens when the hands
334. Maurice Chammah, Could Removing Brock Turner’s Judge Hurt Poor and Minority
Defendants?,
MARSHALL
PROJECT
(June
16,
2016),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/06/16/could-removing-brock-turner-s-judge-hurt-poorand-minority-defendants (describing how the removal of a judge following public backlash against
judge’s perceived leniency in sentencing a white youth in a sexual assault case may discourage
leniency and lead to more severe sentences for clients of color convicted of similar offense); see
also Barkow, supra note 3, at 105–23 (describing how the public, elected officials, and interest
groups advance tough on crime policies that favor lengthy sentences).
335. Community education is another critical component of community oversight of system
actors via technology. It is essential that communities understand the relationship between
technology, the data upon which it relies, and the ways that systems and institutions function. A
prominent example of this educational work is being done by the Our Data Bodies Project, which
describes itself as “a five-person team concerned about the ways our communities’ digital
information is collected, stored, and shared by government and corporations.” Who We Are, OUR
DATA BODIES: HUM. RTS. AND DATA JUS., https://www.odbproject.org/about/who-we-are/ (last
visited Jan. 15, 2020). Given that concern, the Project focuses on the intersection of data collection
and human rights, and provides guidance on data protection, supports community education and
organizing, and demonstrates how data impacts domains such as housing, urban development,
public benefits, and reentry. Id. In a somewhat similar vein, the Detroit Digital Justice Coalition
hosts workshops called DiscoTechs, short for Discovery Technology. About, DETROIT DIGIT. JUST.
COAL., http://detroitdjc.org/about/story/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2021). These workshops “are a space
to learn about the impact and possibilities of technology within our communities,” and serve to
“demystify, engage, and inform the community about issues of Internet use and ownership, and our
communications rights on and offline.” Id.
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that wield the tools are unchanged.336 Body-worn cameras were widely
adopted to curtail police violence against communities of color.337 Isolated
incidents of success meant that they quickly were adopted as part of the
standard suite of remedial mechanisms in systemic efforts to reform
policing.338 Lawsuits and consent decrees demanded their use.339 Police
departments nationwide, spurred on by the promise of additional federal
funding, acquired them.340
Yet for all of the accountability promised, the institutional actors
holding the tools of accountability have not changed, which means the tools
have not been able to meet their potential.341 We have not seen a wholesale

336. Amanda Ripley & Timothy Williams, Body Cameras Have Little Impact on Police
Behavior, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/policebody-camera-study.html; German Lopez, The Failure of Police Body Cameras, VOX (July 21,
2017),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/7/21/15983842/police-body-camerasfailures.
337. Lindsey Van Ness, Body Cameras May Not Be the Easy Answer Everyone Was Looking
For,
PEW
(Jan.
14,
2020),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2020/01/14/body-cameras-may-not-be-the-easy-answer-everyone-waslooking-for (describing the widespread adoption of body-worn cameras following the 2014 killing
of Michael Brown at the hands of a police officer); Ben Miller, Data Pinpoints the Moment When
Police Body Cameras Took Off, GOV’T TECH. (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.govtech.com/data/DataPinpoints-the-Moment-When-Police-Body-Cameras-Took-Off.html.
338. A 2016 Bureau of Justice Statistics survey concluded that nearly half of U.S. law
enforcement agencies had acquired body-worn cameras. Shelley S. Hyland, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, BODY-WORN CAMERAS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2018),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/bwclea16.pdf; Cynthia Lum et. al., Research on Body-Worn
Cameras: What We Know, What We Need to Know, CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 93, 94 (2019),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1745-9133.12412 (“Body-worn cameras . . . are
one of the most rapidly diffusing technologies in policing today. . . .”).
339. New York’s experience with body-worn cameras is one example. Ashley Southall, New
York’s First Police Body Cameras Take to Streets in Upper Manhattan, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/27/nyregion/new-york-police-department-body-cameras.html
(explaining that introduction of body-worn cameras was part of the remedies set forth in litigation
regarding the unconstitutional policing tactics of the New York City Police Department); Floyd v.
City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Because body-worn cameras are
uniquely suited to addressing the constitutional harms at issue in this case, I am ordering the NYPD
to institute a pilot project in which body-worn cameras will be worn for a one-year period by officers
on patrol in one precinct per borough—specifically the precinct with the highest number of stops
during 2012.”).
340. See supra notes 337–339.
341. Body Worn Camera Basics, BALT. POLICE DEP’T (last visited May 7, 2021),
https://www.baltimorepolice.org/transparency/body-worn-cameras (announcing that of 133,000
videos recorded in first six months of implementation of body worn cameras across the Baltimore
Police Department, fourty-seven were flagged for review of potential misconduct); Megan Hickey,
How Often Do Chicago Police officers Fail to Activate Their Body Cameras? It’s Hard to Know,
CBS 2 CHI. (July 30, 2019) https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2019/07/30/inspector-general-chicagopolice-body-cameras/ (reporting that an investigation by the City of Chicago Office of the Inspector
General found that lieutenants failed to review body camera footage or discipline officers who did
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change in the culture of policing or definitive evidence that the cameras
reduce police use of force.342 That can be explained by who holds the tools
and power to ensure accountability.343 It is often the police who decide when
to operate the cameras and what gets recorded.344 Before an incident reaches
a prosecutor’s desk, a myriad of hurdles may stand in the way of
accountability. As a policy matter, the cameras, the data, and the footage
they produce are securely in the possession of law enforcement until law
enforcement decides to make it public.345 And police, along with other
system actors, may have an outsized say over whether conduct caught on
camera will warrant a corrective intervention. Prosecutors rarely prosecute
police.346 That fact does not change when prosecutors do get body camera
footage, which is far more often used to prosecute civilians.347 Thus, rather
than providing a community with an accountability measure, the cameras
have served as another point of grievance by the community seeking
accountability.348

not comply with the body worn camera policy, thereby violating the federal consent decree that
mandated and funded the department’s body worn camera policy).
342. Lum et al., supra note 338, at 109
343. See Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 465–
66 (2018) (describing the cameras as “technology that remains in the hands of the police and at the
mercy of the prosecutor [and] remains embedded in a criminal system bureaucracy that has more
interest in protecting itself than in accountability for its violence against Black people”).
344. See Police Body Camera Policies: Recording Circumstances, BRENNAN C TR. FOR JUST. 1
(Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/police-body-camerapolicies-recording-circumstances
345. Chad Marlow & Gary Daniels, Ohio Bucks a Bad Trend With New Police Body Camera
Law,
ACLU
(Feb.
5,
2019,
10:15
AM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacytechnology/surveillance-technologies/ohio-bucks-bad-trend-new-police-body-camera-law/.
346. Id. But see Justin Fenton, Baltimore Police Officer Who Turned Off Body Camera Charged
With Tampering With Evidence; Others Cleared, BALT. SUN (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-ci-body-camera-tampering-20180124story.html.
347. One study found that 93% of prosecutors who responded that their jurisdiction uses body
worn cameras use the footage from those cameras primarily to prosecute citizens rather than police.
Lum et al., supra note 338 at 108.
348. For thirteen months, Chicago Mayor Rahm Emmanuel blocked the release of dashboard
camera footage showing Chicago police officer Jason Van Dyke killing Laquan McDonald, a Black
seventeen-year-old. While Van Dyke claimed that McDonald lunged at him with a knife, the video
shows Van Dyke shooting McDonald sixteen times as McDonald walked away from him. The
delay in releasing the video coincided with Emmanuel’s reelection campaign. Jessica Glenza,
Chicago Officials Delayed Release of Laquan McDonald Shooting Video, GUARDIAN (Jan. 1, 2016)
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/01/chicago-officials-delayed-release-laquanmcdonald-shooting-video; Bernard E. Harcourt, A Cover-Up in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30,
2015) https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/30/opinion/cover-up-in-chicago.html. Van Dyke was
eventually charged with murder, convicted, and sentenced to nearly seven years in prison. Mitch
Smith & Julie Bosman, Jason Van Dyke Sentenced to Nearly 7 Years for Murdering Laquan
McDonald, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/18/us/jason-van-dyke-

552

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:487

That is why community control and power are so important. When the
gaze of technology is flipped on system actors and the tools are placed in
community hands, it can be used to interrogate and evaluate the system in
ways that are innovative and beneficial.349 For example, Campaign Zero—
an organization dedicated to reducing police violence nationwide 350—began
using big data to evaluate California’s 100 largest municipal police
departments based on the number of arrests made for low-level offenses, the
use of force during an arrest, the rate of homicides solved, the presence or
absence of racial disparities in arrests and use of force, and the treatment of
civilian complaints of police abuse.351 That information can be used to
advocate for changes to police policies and practices.
Chicago’s Citizens Police Data Project also provides a measure of
accountability through data by “tak[ing] records of police interactions with
the public—records that would otherwise be buried in internal databases—
and opens them up to make the data useful to the public, creating a permanent
record for every . . . police officer.”352 CAPstat, a police accountability
database modeled on the Chicago tool, has been developed and is in use in
New York.353 Relying on publicly available data collected from various
sources between 2011 and 2018, the database demonstrates:
[T]ransparency can improve our collective ability to identify trends
of misconduct across, for example, different types of allegations,
sentencing.html. While Chicago officials have moved more quickly since 2015 to release body
camera and dashboard camera footage, the process of releasing such footage varies state by state,
department by department. Richard Fausset & Giulia McDonnell Nieto del Rio, As Body Cameras
Become Common, a Debate Over When to Release the Footage, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2021)
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/02/us/police-body-cameras-andrew-brown-north-carolina.html.
For example, although protesters have demanded the release of body camera footage depicting the
police killing of Andrew Brown Jr., a judge has delayed its release for at least 30 days. Richard
Fausset & Giulia McDonnell Nieto del Rio, Judge Declines Immediate Release of Video in North
Carolina
Shooting,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
30,
2021)
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/04/28/us/andrew-brown-jr-shooting-body-camera.
349. See Mayson, supra note 24, at 2284–86 (recommending the use of algorithmic tools as
diagnostic measures to identify sites of racial disparity for correction).
350. See
Vision,
CAMPAIGN
ZERO
(last
visited
March
1,
2021),
https://www.joincampaignzero.org/#vision.
351. Police Scorecard, CAMPAIGN ZERO, https://policescorecard.org/findings (last visited Jan.
15, 2020).
352. Citizens Police Data Project, INVISIBLE INST., http://invisible.institute/police-data (last
visited Jan. 17, 2020). Critically, it was this data set that revealed multiple allegations of misconduct
against Chicago Police Officer Chicago police officer Jason Van Dyke. Sarah Kaplan, Chicago
Police Officer Charged in Deadly Shooting Has a History of Misconduct Complaints, WASH. POST
(Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/11/25/chicagocop-charged-in-deadly-shooting-has-a-history-of-misconduct-complaints/; see also supra note 348
and accompanying sources.
353. What is this Data?, CAPSTAT, https://www.capstat.nyc/about/what/ (last visited Jan. 17,
2020).
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commands and units that could inform policy debates, improve
public discourse about police misconduct allegations and be a
resource for people who witnessed or were harmed by police
misconduct to help them decide what to do next.354
Though these tools specifically targeted police behavior, one can readily
imagine a similar tool focused on the conduct of judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, probation officials, and parole officials. The Vera Institute for
Justice demonstrated this concept through a project aimed at addressing
prosecutorial discretion in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Mecklenburg County,
North Carolina.355 That work involved collecting data to monitor the exercise
of discretion by prosecutors at various decision points in the criminal legal
system.356 Researchers then analyzed that data to determine the source of
racial disparities for particular charging decisions associated with drug
crimes.357 Once researchers identified the sources of disparity by examining
the data and engaging in a qualitative analysis of decision-making,358
prosecutors in Milwaukee discovered that junior, less experienced
prosecutors pursued drug paraphernalia cases more aggressively than their
colleagues.359
Mecklenburg County prosecutors found that drug
paraphernalia cases constituted 97% of all drug cases, and “press[ing]
[charges] for all drug cases and every drug charge” involving Black women,
despite the fact that many of those cases were ultimately dismissed or
resolved with a diversion into drug treatment.360 These offices made policy
changes to address their findings, resulting in a narrowing of racial disparities
for a subset of the crimes prosecuted by both offices.361
Another example can be found in a recent analysis of just over 105,000
criminal cases handled by the Legal Aid Society of New York and the bail
decisions made by judges in those cases.362 Although the data collected did

354. Id.
355. Wayne McKenzie et al., VERA INST. OF JUST., PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE: USING
DATA TO ADVANCE FAIRNESS IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 1 (Mar. 2009),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/Publications/prosecution-and-racial-justice-using-data-toadvance-fairness-in-criminal-prosecution/legacy_downloads/Using-data-to-advance-fairness-incriminal-prosecution.pdf.
356. Id. at 5.
357. Id. at 6–7.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Anna Maria Barry-Jester, You’ve Been Arrested. Will You Get Bail? Can You Pay It? It
May
All
Depend
on
Your
Judge.,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Jun.
19,
2018),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/youve-been-arrested-will-you-get-bail-can-you-pay-it-it-mayall-depend-on-your-judge/.
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not allow for any demographic analysis, what the effort uncovered was that
bail amounts set on people accused of crimes varied dramatically based on
where a person was arraigned, the crime they were charged with and the
judge presiding over the arraignment.363 Getting arrested on the “wrong day”
could mean that a person is “more than twice as likely to have to” post bail
to purchase their freedom.364
These examples demonstrate how collecting data about the past
behavior of system actors can help inform how they might behave going
forward in ways that align with racial equity. All that is required is a
willingness to subject system actors to scrutiny.365 That is no easy feat; but
if accomplished, greater scrutiny would shift the nature of the inquiry
undertaken by algorithmic tools in the criminal legal system.
3. Listen to the People Being Judged.
One feature of algorithmic decision-making is that it emphasizes
quantitative data for predictive purposes over the narratives that shape the
lives of the individuals to be judged by the state.366 That emphasis is
troubling because it is done in service of what amounts to profiling— though
it is often characterized as prediction. Rather than give in to that dynamic, it
is necessary to adopt an orientation that views stories and anecdotes as data
points that carry just as much—if not more—power than raw numbers and
leave predictive analytics behind.367 The march toward algorithmic tools
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. See Roberts, supra note 27, at 1726–28 (recommending that people employ technology to
“identify and excavate the sites where inequality has been institutionally embedded”).
366. See supra Section I.D.3.
367. In discussing the power of stories to “destabilize hardened and assumed norms” one scholar
pointed to examples of stories told by Black women enmeshed in the criminal legal system,
explaining that:
personal narratives reveal types of information and knowledge that are neither manifested
in the doctrinal representations of their stories nor necessarily reflected in the statistics
that present the quantitative picture of black women within the criminal justice system.
If nothing else, both the statistics pertaining to the conviction and incarceration rates of
African-American women discussed below and stories . . . remind us that there is a real
cost to being marked by difference within society. Telling our versions of our stories is
merely a first step in revealing the reach of institutional power and the systemic nature
of oppression.
Mario L. Barnes, Black Women’s Stories and the Criminal Law: Restating the Power of Narrative,
39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 941, 954, 957 (2006). Indeed, stories open up the world in ways that can
alter human judgment:
Stories humanize us. They emphasize our differences in ways that can ultimately bring
us closer together. They allow us to see how the world looks from behind someone else’s
spectacles. They challenge us to wipe off our own lenses and ask, “Could I have been
overlooking something all along?” Telling stories invests text with feeling, gives voice
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needs to be balanced by an accounting of the context that produces the
quantitative data.
A racial justice lens suggests an approach that privileges the voices and
narratives of those closest to the harms perpetuated by the system. 368 That
does not mean dispensing with numbers altogether. Statistics serve real and
important purposes. They can inform decision-making, shape policy, and
highlight patterns of harm. They can help decisionmakers take stock of the
barriers that stand in the way of the accused in a more rigorous way. They
can also foster transparency around the decision-making process and provide
an avenue for accountability. Indeed, the entire premise of flipping the gaze
of tools on the actors in the system is rooted in the idea that statistics bear
value and can influence the exercise of discretion.
These benefits carry a danger. Privileging quantitative data over
qualitative information can blind decisionmakers from doing the work to
uncover the unique forces, facts, and circumstances that lead people into the
criminal legal system. Pure reliance on statistical metrics stifles the curiosity
and creativity that system actors may need to fully engage the complexities
of peoples’ lives in meaningful, productive and effective, ways. For
example, the number of individuals who fail to appear in court following their
initial release from custody is a specific data point. That information can
shape systemic responses to failures to appear. But without context and
nuance—answering the question of why it is that people fail to appear in
court—those responses will be inadequate. Stories—the qualitative
information—give meaning to the numbers.
There is another important benefit to stories. One of the many things
that I learned during my time defending people who were accused or
to those who were taught to hide their emotions. Hearing stories invites hearers to
participate, challenging their assumptions, jarring their complacency, lifting their spirits,
lowering their defenses. Stories are useful tools for the underdog because they invite the
listener to suspend judgment, listen for the story’s point, and test it against his or her own
version of reality.
Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2411, 2440 (1989). Accordingly, “[s]tories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are powerful
means for destroying mindset — the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared
understandings against a background of which legal and political discourse takes place.” Id. at
2413.
368. “[T]hose who have experienced discrimination speak with a special voice to which we
should listen. Looking to the bottom—adopting the perspective of those who have seen and felt the
falsity of the liberal promise—can assist critical scholars in the task of fathoming the
phenomenology of law and defining the elements of justice.” Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987). That
is because those who have been harmed by the oppressive, interlocking systems of racial power
have unique experiences and insights to offer that generate novel solutions to racial inequality. Id.
at 325.
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convicted of crimes is that context matters. I came to learn that when judges
or other actors in the criminal legal system took stock of that context, more
often than not it worked to the benefit of my clients. Although there were
certain predictable and identifiable barriers to success—comparisons to
similarly situated individuals were generally informative—one’s life
circumstances added a layer of nuance that group-level data too often
obscured. That is because group-level data is about generalizations rather
than specifics.369 Turning from the general to the specific when deciding a
person’s fate requires a heavier emphasis on the stories that comprise a
person’s life.370
As with the other potential solutions, this one has its own challenges.
Of course, decisionmakers may already take stock of context in a range of
ways. That consideration can be based on their personal preferences, biases,
or past experiences. But the potential differences in the weights assigned to
context and stories by decisionmakers is not unlike what already takes place
in the criminal legal system. As long as actors have discretion, they will
always be tasked with striking a balance among—and attributing weight to—
the information presented to them. That is an unavoidable consequence of
being empowered to make decisions about someone else’s life.
The answer is to ensure that stories are a part of the decision-making
calculus—while qualitative data is used to expose and correct the biased
exercise of discretion—rather than in service of making a prediction about
someone.371 Compelling stories about a client’s life can shape the outcome
of a sentencing proceeding in dramatic ways. Stories can drive judges away
from rote sentencing practices and force them to engage facts that “center
and humanize” the person to be sentenced and “disrupt judicial inclinations,
be they implicit or overt, to base sentences on conclusions derived from
bias.”372 Proper consideration of client stories may allow us to move toward
a larger ideal: a system of individualized justice, tailored to the circumstances
of one’s life and weighed against the allegations they face, or the crimes for
which they have been convicted.

369. Aaron J. Fisher et al., Lack of Group-to-Individual Generalizability is a Threat to Human
Subjects Research, 115 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S E6106, E6113 (2018).
370. One judge’s description of sentencing in the context of algorithmic tools is clarifying:
“When done correctly, the sentencing process is more art than science. Sentencing requires the
application of soft skills and intuitive insights that are not easily defined or even described.
Sentencing judges are informed by experience and the adversarial process.” Noel L. Hillman, The
Use of Artificial Intelligence in Gauging the Risk of Recidivism, 58 JUDGES’ J. 36, 37 (2019).
371. See Roberts, supra note 27, at 1727 (suggesting an end to the type of predictive analytics
that expand the carceral state).
372. Lindsey Webb, Slave Narratives and the Sentencing Court, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 125, 142–43 (2018).
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Getting to individualized justice begins with acknowledging that our
current system singles out the disfavored among us for control, oppression
and punishment, because those on the receiving end are perceived as
deserving it.373 That ideology is cloaked in a historical narrative that refuses
to believe that pain even exists at all for people of color and makes it that
much easier to punish indefinitely.374 Combating this mindset requires
“tell[ing] a different story,” one that allows decisionmakers to “resist the
narratives that render” people of color and other marginalized groups “as
superhuman to the point of being impervious to pain, and insist[ing] that their
pain is our collective responsibility to help heal.”375 Shifting the narrative in
that direction means acknowledging the present day impacts of past systems
of oppression in to arrive at a set of solutions that stretch beyond those
ordinarily deployed by the criminal legal system.376 Context matters not
because it excuses the harms that someone causes, but because it
“acknowledges and transforms the realities that made that harm likely.”377
The current Canadian model of sentencing provides a useful, albeit
cautionary, guide.378 A series of reforms to the Canadian sentencing regime
were enacted in 1996.379 The first Canadian Supreme Court decision that
spoke to those reforms, R. v. Gladue,380 deemed the reforms “remedial in
nature” and aimed at “ameliorat[ing] the serious problem of
overrepresentation of [A]boriginal people in prisons, and . . . encourag[ing]
sentencing judges to have recourse to a restorative approach to
sentencing.”381 The commitment to act and repair the harms of the past was
373. DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON: VIOLENCE, MASS INCARCERATION, AND THE
ROAD TO REPAIR 192–95 (2019).
374. Id. at 194–95.
375. Id. at 222.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 224. The type of attention given to context in restorative justice may provide some
guidance. As a practice, it requires “acknowledging responsibility for one’s actions, acknowledging
the impact of one’s actions on others, expressing genuine remorse, taking actions to repair the harm
to the degree possible, and no longer committing similar harm. . . .” Id. at 236–37.
378. There are, of course, notable differences between the structure and character of the
Canadian criminal legal system as it pertains to sentencing, chief among them is the incorporation
of restorative justice principles in sentencing people of native descent. Toni Williams, Punishing
Women: The Promise and Perils of Contextualized Sentencing for Aboriginal Women in Canada,
55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 269, 276–78 (2007); see also Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster,
Weathering the Storm? Testing Long-Standing Canadian Sentencing Policy in the Twenty-First
Century, 45 CRIME & JUST. 359, 364–66 (2016) (describing Canadian sentencing practice).
379. See Williams, supra note 378 at 273–78 (describing sentencing reforms enacted in Canada).
380. [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (Can.)
381. Id. para. 93. Notably, the parallels between racial disparity in the sentencing of Black
people and white people in the United States and Aboriginal people and whites in Canada are
striking. The Gladue Court took stock of the sentencing disparities in Canada at the time reforms
were enacted, pointing out that “[n]ative people come into contact with Canada’s correctional
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the impetus for the change in the law. According to the Court, “[t]he drastic
overrepresentation of [A]boriginal peoples within both the Canadian prison
population and the criminal justice system” was expressly recognized as “a
sad and pressing social problem” requiring redress in the eyes of the
Canadian Parliament.382
Gladue traced the sources of sentencing disparity to causes such as
“poverty, substance abuse, lack of education, and the lack of employment
opportunities for [A]boriginal people . . . . bias against [A]boriginal people
and from an unfortunate institutional approach that is more inclined to refuse
bail and to impose more and longer prison terms for [A]boriginal
offenders.”383 The law placed the onus on sentencing judges to remedy
“injustice against [A]boriginal peoples” by requiring judges to “pay
particular attention to the circumstances of [A]boriginal offenders, with the
implication that those circumstances are significantly different from those of
non-[A]boriginal offenders.”384 Those circumstances include:
The unique systemic or background factors which may have played
a part in bringing the particular [A]boriginal offender before the
courts; and . . . .[t]he types of sentencing procedures and sanctions
which may be appropriate in the circumstances for the offender
because of his or her particular [A]boriginal heritage or
connection.385
Critically, judges must evaluate not only the direct discrimination
encountered by native people, but the systemic and institutional structures
that drive inequality and injustice.386

system in numbers grossly disproportionate to their representation in the community . . . . almost
10% of the federal penitentiary population is native (including 13% of the federal women’s prisoner
population) compared to about 2% of the population nationally . . . .” Id. para. 60. At bottom, the
Court explained, “[t]he Canadian criminal justice system has failed the Aboriginal peoples of
Canada—First Nations, Inuit and Métis people, on-reserve and off-reserve, urban and rural—in all
territorial and governmental jurisdictions.” Id. paras. 60–70. A 2009 statistical analysis reveals that
Aboriginal persons have consistently comprised 17 to 19% of all adult admissions to
Canadian federal penitentiaries for the past decade, even though Indigenous peoples
represent only 3% of the Canadian population. The statistics are even more shocking
when it comes to admission to provincial jails. In 2007/2008, Indigenous persons
comprised 21% of all admissions to provincial jail in Newfoundland and British
Columbia, 35% in Alberta, 69% in Manitoba, 76% in the Yukon, 81% in Saskatchewan,
and 86% in the Northwest Territories.
David Milward & Debra Parkes, Gladue: Beyond Myth and Towards Implementation in Manitoba,
35 MANITOBA L.J. 84, 84–85 (2011).
382. Gladue, 1 S.C.R. para. 64.
383. Id. para. 65.
384. Id. paras. 65–66.
385. Id. para. 66.
386. Id. paras. 67–69.
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The law also directs judges to consider the prevalence of restorative
justice in the indigenous community, leading to a regime that requires judges
to weigh restorative justice principles in the analysis of an appropriate
sentence.387 In practice, judges may take “judicial notice of the broad
systemic and background factors affecting [A]boriginal people, and of the
priority given in [A]boriginal cultures to a restorative approach to
sentencing.”388 Case-specific details are to come from counsel and a
presentence report.389
The fact that this regime may yield disparate sentences for Aboriginal
people compared to their non-Aboriginal counterparts for the same offense
is an accepted function of an individualized system of justice. Such a result
is to be expected when a judge undertakes a holistic consideration of the
person being sentenced, the person harmed, the affected community, and the
available sanctions.390
Of course, the gap between theory and practice is often the space where
disappointment resides, and the implementation of Canada’s sentencing
reforms and adherence to Gladue is one such space. The system has not
dramatically reduced the disparities in sentencing suffered by Aboriginal
people compared to their white counterparts in Canada.391 Yet the failings of
Gladue and the statutory regime it interpreted can be readily explained.
Those explanations can guide the implementation of similar reforms
elsewhere.
First, there are natural limits to a sentencing judge’s ability to account
for and remedy the discrimination and structural barriers to equality that drive
people into the criminal legal system.392 It is also the case that Gladue and
the law have been applied in an irregular and uncertain fashion across all

387. Id. paras. 70–71. Gladue described restorative justice:
as an approach to remedying crime in which it is understood that all things are interrelated
and that crime disrupts the harmony which existed prior to its occurrence, or at least
which it is felt should exist. The appropriateness of a particular sanction is largely
determined by the needs of the victims, and the community, as well as the offender. The
focus is on the human beings closely affected by the crime.
Id. para. 71.
388. Id. para. 7.
389. Id.
390. Id. paras. 86–88.
391. See Graeme Hamilton, Twenty Years after Federal Government Changed Sentencing,
Aboriginals Still Disproportionately Fill Our Prisons, NAT’L POST (last updated Aug. 4, 2016),
https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/sentence-enough-twenty-years-after-gladue-aboriginalsstill-disproportionately-fill-canadian-prisons (describing persistent overrepresentation of
indigenous people in Canada’s prisons, despite Gladue, and noting failure to provide alternatives to
incarceration or resources to fully implement sentencing reforms).
392. R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, 474–75, para. 69 (Can.).
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offenses—most notably those deemed “serious.”393 Everything from the
preparation of presentence reports that incorporate the inquiry made by
Gladue to misgivings about the value of Gladue in particular cases have
limited its effectiveness.394 And requiring system actors to be more attentive
to context does not, by itself, eliminate the biases they may already harbor in
carrying out that mandate.
Notwithstanding the real challenges of implementation, the Gladue
framework represents a purposeful shift in the information that a sentencing
judge is required to focus on and the weight those factors are to be given.
Such a shift, if adopted in the United States against the backdrop of
algorithmic tools395 and history of racial inequality, may change our
understanding of what justice requires, while avoiding the pitfalls of profiling
that can flow from algorithmic tools. One can conceive of a criminal legal
system that invokes the use of narratives “to shed light on the conditions of
an unjust, racialized institution and to humanize the people placed within
it.”396 Numbers can only tell a part of that story.
4. Challenges: Legal and Otherwise.
Many of the recommendations advanced in Part II require a more robust
endorsement of race-conscious remedies than the Equal Protection Clause
currently allows. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits remedies that
“contain[ ] an explicit racial classification [and] laws that assign rights or
burdens based on racial classifications”397 unless they are narrowly tailored
to meet a compelling government interest. The types of remedial efforts
advanced in Part II, especially those that rest on explicit consideration of race,
have run into difficult legal challenges in the past in other contexts398 and
393. Id. para. 86.
394. Milward & Parkes, supra note 344, at 86, 94, 96.
395. It is worth noting that algorithmic tools such as risk assessment instruments are widely used
in Canada to inform sentencing decisions and issues related to treatment and supervision. Offender
Risk
Assessment
Practices
Vary
Across
Canada,
PUB.
SAFETY
CAN.,
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2017-s015/index-en.aspx (last visited Jan. 18,
2020); Simon Fraser University, Risk Assessment Tools Lead to Fewer Incarcerations Without
Jeopardizing
Public
Safety,
SCIENCEDAILY
(Oct.
28,
2019),
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/10/191028164344.htm (“Tools are used in nearly every
Canadian province and U.S. state, and at least 40 other countries.”).
396. Webb, supra note 372 at 151. Indeed, such narratives were invoked on the road to the
abolition of slavery, as a means to expose the brutality of the system and educate people about the
humanity and dignity of people who were enslaved. Id.
397. Huq, supra note 11, at 1083.
398. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269-271 (1978); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311, 316-17 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S.Ct. 2198, 2205-07
(2016); see also Haney-López, supra note 296, at 1781–84 (describing how remedial efforts are
viewed by the Supreme Court through the lens of “colorblindness” which “consistently imposes the
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might here as well.399 Such challenges are to be expected.400 The types of
obstacles that always accompany the implementation of reforms—from
institutional resistance to logistics—warrant attention.401
The public appetite for the types of remedial measures and policy
recommendations described in Part II also needs to grow. They seek to shift
power, redress longstanding harms, and cure significant structural inequities.
America has long approached efforts to remedy structural racism as a zerosum game; where one race or cohort of people may be made whole, the work
required to bridge the gap between equity and the status quo necessarily
means that another group or race (or several races) must lose out. 402 That
zero-sum mentality is complemented by simple racial fear—fear that a status
quo which has served the interests of those in power will be upended to their
disadvantage.403 The zero-sum, fear-based worldview has bedeviled
remedial measures of all sorts for decades, including efforts to integrate
schools, housing and the workforce. The same is true in the criminal legal
system. 404

most stringent form of scrutiny,” ensuring that plaintiffs challenging such remedies “virtually
always win”).
399. There is at least debate about whether differential treatment along racial lines would be
barred by Equal Protection jurisprudence. Huq, supra note 11, at 1133; cf. Deborah Hellman,
Measuring Algorithmic Fairness, 106 VA. L. REV. 811, 819, 864 (2020) (positing that antidiscrimination law does not pose insurmountable barriers to race conscious remedial efforts aimed
at improving the fairness and accuracy of algorithmic tools).
400. The law naturally preserves the status quo. Thus, it “typically works to disadvantage
outsiders such as people of color, women, sexual minorities, and the poor.” Capers, supra note 263,
at 24–25.
401. See,
e.g.,
N.Y.
STATE
SENATE
BILL
S7506B,
303–12
(2020)
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/S7506 (expanding the number of crimes eligible
for cash bail, three months after the enactment of bail reform); Nick Pinto, America’s Crisis Daddy
Andrew Cuomo Exploits Coronavirus Panic to Push Bail Reform Rollback in New York, INTERCEPT
(Mar. 25, 2020) https://theintercept.com/2020/03/25/coronavirus-andrew-cuomo-new-york-bailreform/ (describing the successful effort to roll back some bail reforms by police, prosecutors, and
politicians). But see Christopher Robbins, New York State Legislature Votes to Repeal Law 50-A
that Shields Police from Scrutiny, GOTHAMIST (June 9, 2020) https://gothamist.com/news/newyork-state-legislature-votes-repeal-law-50-shields-police-scrunity (reporting the repeal of 50-A, a
law that shielded police misconduct records from the public, which passed despite opposition from
police unions state-wide).
402. See Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism as a Zero-Sum Game
That They Are Now Losing, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCH. SCI. 215, 216–17 (2011) (finding that not “only do
[w]hites think more progress has been made toward equality than do Blacks, but [w]hites also now
believe that this progress is linked to a new inequality—at their expense”).
403. Charles M. Blow, White Extinction Anxiety, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/24/opinion/america-white-extinction.html.
404. Simply put, our criminal legal system is replete with “ill considered policies because we
have a pathological political process that caters to the public’s fears and emotions without any
institutional safeguards or checks for rationality.” BARKOW, supra note 4, at 12.
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Those challenges cannot be dispositive. Resistance to change is natural.
Indeed, our racial history has moved through a “reform/retrenchment
dialectic.”405 Reforms yield racial progress, only to eventually engender
resistance that turns into retrenchment and regress.406 That is why bold
interventions are necessary to upend the status quo.407 The embedded nature
of racism and the status quo preservationist limits of classical liberal reforms
means that wholesale change—rather than piecemeal fixes—must be
employed.408 Changes to the law can be driven by cultural shifts, as popular
will can shape and reshape legal doctrine.409 Swaying public sentiment to
align the law with the types of remedial measures advanced here would be
necessary. Unprecedented national and international mass movements in
response to racial injustice and racial hostility 410 have provided some hope
about what is possible.411
One of Professor Derrick Bell’s widely known theories may inform the
strategy undertaken to harness the will to foster change: interest convergence.
This principle provides that “[t]he interests of blacks in achieving racial
equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of
whites.”412 In other words, progressive reform has a chance to take hold if
the reforms sought are in the interests of the dominant class—those with the
power needed to implement them. 413
Proponents of algorithmic tools—including criminal legal system actors
who are aligned with the dominant class—should have an interest in tools
that work as advertised to produce a functioning and just criminal legal

405. Carbado, supra note 263, at 1607–08.
406. Id.
407. “[T]rue change is possible only through radical interventions.” Capers, supra note 241, at
27.
408. Wing, supra note 263, at 52. We must also be prepared to face the fact that even
comprehensive changes may not ultimately do the trick. Id.
409. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 381–84
(2009) (describing how politics and judicial interpretation have shaped Constitutional meaning.).
410. Eduardo Porter, After the Election, a Nation Tinged with Racial Hostility, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/business/after-the-election-a-nation-tinged-withracial-hostility.html’.
411. Larry Buchanan et al., Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History,
N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floydprotests-crowd-size.html.
412. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
413. Wing, supra note 263, at 48; Carbado, supra note 263, at 1608; Capers, supra note 263 at
25.
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system free from racial inequality.414 Those who experience the racialized
harms and burdens imposed by the criminal legal system likewise have an
interest in alleviating those harms. Each of the policy prescriptions in Part II
lend themselves to interest convergence because, if implemented, they can
best satisfy the reform-oriented concerns of criminal legal system actors and
those who have experienced the system as the accused.
Of course, getting people to see how their interests may intersect is not
easy. Even a cursory examination of America’s political history reveals how
hard it is for people to understand how systems of racial oppression can
produce harms that are at odds with the fervent sense of superiority that
racism foments.415 Despite these challenges, at the very least, interest
convergence sheds some light on how we might overcome the practical
hurdles raised by imposing a racial justice lens on the operation of criminal
legal system algorithms.
III. ALGORITHMIC TOOLS AND PRAGMATIC ABOLITION
The responses to actuarial risk assessment I have catalogued are largely
aimed at shifting the balance of power from actors in the criminal legal
system to those who are usually subjected to the harmful treatment by that
system. Algorithmic tools may not be able to deliver on the hope that they
can reduce racial bias in decision-making. They may not imbue the criminal
system with fairness or justice. But their design and use can require a critical
inquiry of the way our system operates. And that inquiry produces an
opportunity to fundamentally transform our current approach to criminal
justice.416
I have suggested four interventions: (1) forcing actors to account for the
ways in which racism has infected every institution that governs us;417 (2)
414. In New York, for example, District Attorneys in Manhattan, Queens, Bronx, and Brooklyn
have shown support for certain parole reform legislation, citing the current law’s disproportionate
impact on people of color and imploring that “the exorbitant money we are wasting on their
reincarceration should be reinvested into programs that make us safer.” Darcel Clark et al., On
Parole Violations, Less is More: Three DAs Urge Reform to Stop Sending People Back to Prison,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, (Mar. 20, 2020) https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-parole-less-ismore-20200312-bsujoxccpjdh5pocvdgh2d3wny-story.html.
415. Sean Illing, How the Politics of Racial Resentment Is Killing White People, VOX (Mar. 19,
2019),
https://www.vox.com/2019/3/19/18236247/dying-of-whiteness-trump-politics-jonathanmetzl; Damon Young, This Is What White Supremacy Looks Like, NATION (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/this-is-what-white-supremacy-looks-like/.
416. A fundamental transformation refers most readily to the remaking of the American legal
system within the frame of racial justice. See Paul Butler, The System is Working the Way It Is
Supposed To: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L. J. 1419, 1478 (2016) (describing
the need to end the current criminal legal system and fundamentally remake it and America).
417. See supra Section II.A.
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demanding that those who make and deploy algorithmic tools demonstrate
that they will not produce racial harms for people of color;418 (3) holding
actors accountable for their decisions by shifting the aim of the tools at those
actors;419 and (4) infusing our system with attention to context,
circumstances, and basic dignity.420 In doing so, the hope is that we can use
these algorithmic tools in service of building a different criminal legal
system. In this way, the solutions I have outlined operate with a pragmatic
abolitionist ethos.
Talk of abolition is sometimes met with derision, because it implies the
end of a system without thought given to what comes after the fall.421 When
I advance a pragmatic abolitionist ethos, it does not mean that the criminal
legal system as we know it ends immediately, or that abolitionists are not
already pragmatic. Practically speaking, a sudden disintegration of
America’s criminal legal system is not possible.422 The system is too massive
to fall all at once. Instead, a pragmatic abolitionist ethos here means that we
press for a wholesale transformation of the criminal legal system while
maintaining an “openness to unfinished alternatives,”423 all while using the
tools available to us to do so.
That involves turning to approaches that contradict the premises of the
old system, while ensuring those approaches are plausible enough to compete
with the system currently in place.424 Reforms that produce a system that is
radically out of step with the status quo will be met with resistance. That is
because they seem too far outside the realm of possibility—too unrealistic—
given our collective experience with the criminal legal system. But reforms
that help to build and shift power in basic ways might be both plausible and
effective enough to help carve a path toward transforming the system.425
418. See supra Section II.B.
419. See supra Section II.C.
420. See supra Section II.D.
421. See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 105 (2003) (noting that the question of
what replaces jails and prisons following abolition “often interrupts further consideration of the
prospects for abolition”). The question misunderstands abolition, because “[a]bolitionists always
have their eyes set on a future they are in the process of creating.” Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword:
Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 120 (2019) (explaining why abolitionist thinking
extends beyond the end of a regime or practice to focus on what comes next).
422. Indeed, “[p]rison abolition is a long-term project that requires strategically working toward
the complete elimination of carceral punishment. No abolitionist expects all prison walls to come
tumbling down at once.” Roberts, supra note 421, at 114.
423. Allegra McLeod, Confronting Criminal Law’s Violence: The Possibilities of Unfinished
Alternatives, 8 HARV. UNBOUND 109, 109 (2013).
424. Id. at 120.
425. Akbar, supra note 343, at 460–69 (detailing an abolitionist ethos built on the need to end
“punitive systems of social control” and drive the “reorganization of the state through the
redistribution of power and resources”).
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In the most hopeful view, reformers might use the tools alongside, and
in service of, efforts to steadily dismantle the carceral state,426 with an eye
toward ultimately replacing that state with something better suited to
delivering justice.427 That something should be thought of as a “constellation
of alternative strategies and institutions”428 rather than “one single alternative
to the existing system of incarceration.”429 Doing so necessarily demands
amassing power430 that drives changes to “unravel rather than widen the net
of social control through criminalization.” 431
It also means that
transformation of the system takes place over time, intermittently,
notwithstanding the frustration that will be felt by the deliberate pace of
change.
Such a vision is dramatically different than the one offered now in
conversations at the intersection of technological tools and the criminal legal
system. At present, the turn to tools has—in the best case—been in service
of a system that operates more efficiently but retains all of its fundamental
characteristics. Indeed, “the state uses artificial intelligence and predictive
technologies to reproduce existing inequalities while creating new modes of
carceral control and foreclosing imagination of a more democratic future.”432
Yet if we know anything about the criminal legal system—following
repeated study, anecdotal evidence, and a wealth of experience—it is not well
426. See supra Sections II.C.1 & II.C.2 (discussing potential ways to account for race in
algorithmic tools to drive changes in criminal legal system policy).
427. “As movement voices suggest, the abolitionist project is not only negative, it is imaginative;
solutions involve social organizations and the reallocation of resources, with investments in jobs,
health care, and schools as alternative frameworks for existing investments in policing and
incarceration.” Akbar, supra note 343, at 471. Professor Dorothy Roberts has charted such a course,
by suggesting that abolitionists can invoke the U.S. Constitution to advance abolitionist goals.
Roberts, supra note 421, at 105–20. Specifically, Professor Roberts recommends “using the
Constitution to build a society based on principles of freedom, equal humanity, and democracy–a
society that has no need for prisons.” Id. at 110. Such a project is multifaceted. It includes holding
courts and legislatures to a faithful reading of the Constitution. Id. at 110–13. It also means
adopting “nonreformist reforms” that “make transformative changes in carceral systems with the
objective of demolishing those systems rather than fixing them.” Id. at 114. It means mitigating
the harms that carceral punishment imposes. Id. at 118. And it means using the Constitution to
demand the investments required for a society to function without prisons. Id. at 119–20.
428. DAVIS, supra note 421 at 107.
429. Id. at 108.
430. Power here is best defined as “not a thing but rather a capacity composed of active and
changing relationships enabling a person, group, or institution to compel others to do things they
would not do on their own.” Rather than attempting to wrest power away from institutions, we
should aim to “make power” through movement building—the result of developing capacities and
putting them to work toward transformative ends. RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG:
PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 247–48 (2007)
(emphasis omitted).
431. Id. at 242.
432. Roberts, supra note 421 at 29.
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suited to deliver the justice for which people clamor. It falls short in
providing accountability to those harmed by crime, rehabilitation to those
who have run afoul of the law, and fairness to all. It traffics in race and
inequality. It is the culminating site of all of our social ills. It must be
dismantled.433
Implementing the types of solutions I have outlined would mean altering
the way the system operates while acknowledging and confronting the world
as it is. It would mean forcing stakeholders to pay attention to context rather
than a forecast, at a societal and individual level, when making decisions
about the course of a person’s life. It would also mean grappling with the
ways that decisions made by criminal legal system actors may be riddled with
or reflective of the bias that infects the world around us. This framework
represents a reasonable shift away from much of what we currently accept
about the criminal legal system—that what someone has done or been
accused of renders context irrelevant, that actors cannot be held to account
for biased decision-making, and that bias is inevitable and therefore cannot
be addressed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether or not algorithmic tools will catalyze the types of changes
needed to fundamentally alter the way the criminal legal system operates
remains to be seen. As communities, scholars, activists, and stakeholders
have pointed out, these tools reflect back to us the world that we live in. If
we are honest about it, what we see in that reflection is a criminal legal system
riddled with racism and injustice. A racial justice lens helps us to understand
that and demands that we adjust our responses to what we see to create the
type of world that we want to inhabit. We can undertake that work, or
continue along our present course and reify the biases and unfairness that
already characterize our criminal legal system, but the ultimate choice is ours
to make. If we choose wisely, we will use the tools—problems and all—to
help us engage in wholesale transformation of the system.

433. “In other words, the way to stop big data’s threat to society is not to improve big data. It is
to work toward changing the unjust structures that big data supports.” Roberts, supra note 27, at
1725.

